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Abstract 
 
  This thesis investigates techniques for improving the security and availability of secure 
wireless multimedia systems.  Three effects are discussed in this study:  1) The effect on the 
audio-video capacity of the wireless system by securing the voice signal is measured;  2) The 
effect of the audio-video traffic originating foreign to the measured wireless local area network, 
thus using an access point to forward the traffic is evaluated; and 3) The effect of using an audio-
only signal compared with an audio-video signal is also related to the capacity of the wireless 
system.  The effects are determined experimentally using 36 human subjects interacting with a 
wireless multimedia system which was developed as part of this thesis effort.  Additionally, 
techniques for deploying wireless multimedia systems including the maturity and security of the 
technology are addressed.  Analysis of the experimental data suggests that securing the voice 
traffic has no significant effect on the quality of the audio signal received, which indicates that 
the system has a good design.  Additional analysis of the data suggests that an 18.4% 
improvement in the perceived quality of the audio signal can be made by routing the audio and 
video traffic through an access point instead of allowing the audio and video traffic to flow 
directly between two arbitrary nodes within a wireless local area network.  Results suggest that 
increasing the number of conversations reduces the perceived quality of the audio signal by 
23.5% and the video signal by 16.8%.  Additionally, results suggest that by disabling video 
capability, the perceived quality of audio increases by 38.9%.  Existing analytical and computer 
models estimate the audio and video capacity at eleven conversations.   The empirical data within 
this thesis suggests that this an overestimation of audio-video capacity which is caused by 
assuming bit error rates of 0.1 bits/sec accurately model wireless networks.  This study suggests 
that the true capacity of a wireless multimedia system using 802.11g is one audio-only 
conversation on the wireless network.  
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VOICE AND VIDEO CAPACITY OF A  
SECURE WIRELESS SYSTEM 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Decisions made now regarding implementation strategies for collaborative applications 
that rely upon multimedia capability will result in production systems that will inherit the security 
and voice quality features provided by the underlying communication protocols.  The Air Force 
has shown increased interest in collaborative applications that allow multiple users to conduct 
voice and video communication and other multimedia services using applications built upon the 
IP (Internet Protocol) and the RTP (Real Time Protocol).  These efforts may provide a cost 
savings and improvement in the effectiveness of logistics operations in applications such as aerial 
port operations, tanker mission support planning, as well as the coordination of flight line 
maintenance activities.  One of the technology gaps that exist within the realm of secure wireless 
multimedia is the ability to integrate secure voice and video features into existing applications.  
This thesis provides the technical details of how to integrate secure voice and video 
communications into a Java application in addition to evaluating the capacity of the system to 
support wireless use.  Additionally, the thesis provides analysis of experimental data that are used 
to determine the capacity of a secure audio-video wireless system.  
 
1.2 Problem Definition 
 
 Empirical data related to the capacity of secure wireless multimedia systems are often not 
used to verify the accuracy of analytical and computer-based simulations of this capability.  This 
thesis provides both data and analysis of a secure wireless multimedia system’s capacity and how 
1 
 it relates to several analytical and computer-based simulations.  Additionally, the effects of 
routing the traffic through an access point as well as the effect of securing the signal are 
investigated. 
 
1.3 Goals 
 This thesis tests the hypothesis that securing a voice transmission significantly reduces 
the voice quality in a wireless network.  It can be expected that other variables to include the 
pixel size of the transmitted video as well as the number of simultaneous conversations is far 
more critical to predicting voice and video quality as opposed to the effect of adding security 
features to the multimedia stream.  An additional question to be answered in this thesis is the 
effect of routing the traffic through an AP (access point) as opposed to simply having two nodes 
on the same WLAN (wireless local area network) exchange audio and video information.  All of 
these questions are answered in terms of the audio and video quality as evaluated by human 
subjects.   
 
1.4 Approach 
 To accomplish the goals of this research effort, it is necessary to use human subject data 
in conjunction with a system that is capable of transmission and receipt of multimedia through a 
wireless connection.  Use of IEEE 802.11g [21] (hereafter referred to as 802.11g) equipment, 
which is theoretically capable of 54 Mbps (megabits/sec), is used for the entire study.  The 
software that the human subjects are exposed to must be able to enable or disable the secure 
features, change the number of conversations on the WLAN, enable or disable the video feature 
and allow routing of real-time traffic through the AP and use a node-to-node model.  When the 
subject data are collected, the empirical results are compared with existing computer and 
analytical models.   
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1.5 Preview 
  Empirical data collected within this study suggests that securing the voice traffic within 
the system does not significantly affect the quality of the audio signal received.  Additionally, a 
significant improvement to the audio signal can be made by routing the traffic through an AP.  
Several internal checks for validity are conducted in the analysis section of this study.  Two 
results suggest that increasing the number of conversations significantly decreases both audio and 
video quality and that disabling video significantly improves the quality of the audio connection.  
Overall, it was learned that a single conversation, with the video disabled, produces a 2.8 out of 5 
Mean Opinion Score which is interpreted as a “fair” or “slightly annoying” audio quality.  When 
the video capability is enabled, a 1.8 out of 5 Mean Opinion Score is obtained, which is 
interpreted as a “poor” or “annoying” audio quality.  In the case of two audio connections, 2.2 out 
of 5 Mean Opinion Score is produced which also relates to a “poor” or “annoying” audio quality.  
More traffic than this causes a 1 out of 5 Mean Opinion Score, which is interpreted as a “bad,” 
“very annoying” or “unusable” audio quality.  Therefore, the data suggests that no more than one 
audio and video conversation can occur in a WLAN with current 802.11g equipment, whereas 
two audio-only conversations can occur using the same equipment.     
 
1.6 Implications 
 The major implication of this study is that existing computer and analytical models yield 
different results than what was observed in this study.  Specifically, computer and analytical 
models predicted much greater capacities than is actually possible with existing 802.11g 
equipment and software developed for this study.  Additionally, the data within this study 
contains evidence that security features do not significantly affect the performance of the system.  
3 
 This thesis also successfully demonstrated a method to secure real-time multimedia 
communication within existing Java applications.   
 
1.7 Summary 
 The goal of this thesis is to allow the integration of secure multimedia capability within 
Java applications and the evaluation of the capacity of a 802.11g WLAN to support various 
numbers of conversations in various modes of operation.   
 Chapter II describes the current state of VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) technology 
with special focus on current methods to secure real-time traffic.   
 Chapter III describes the thesis methodology that is used to answer the questions that is 
also defined in detail in the chapter.  The two primary questions are: 1) Is there a significant 
effect on the quality of the audio and video data by routing the traffic through an AP compared 
with two arbitrary nodes on a WLAN transmitting and receiving audio and video traffic?; and 2) 
Is there a significant impact by securing the audio traffic on the quality of the audio received?  
Additionally, a method that was developed as part of this thesis effort to secure multimedia IP 
traffic when using Java applications is discussed in detail.   
 Chapter IV describes the results and analysis of the subject data that was collected as it 
relates to the questions that were developed in detail in Chapter III.     
 Chapter V discusses the relationship between the empirical results and existing computer 
and analytical models for modeling the capacity for multimedia traffic within IP networks.   
 Chapter VI discusses both the relevance of the current investigation and gives 
recommendations for future research that builds on the results of this thesis effort.   
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II. Literature Review 
 
  
 This chapter describes the current state of VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) 
technology with special focus on current methods to secure the real-time traffic.  Section 2.1 
discusses two family of protocols that are capable of voice and video services over IP (Internet 
Protocol) networks: H.323 [25] and SIP (Session Initialization Protocol) [22].  Section 2.2 
describes how RTP (Real Time Protocol) is used to transmit the data containing the real-time 
voice and video data.  Section 2.3 describes how audio information is compressed so that it may 
be transmitted using RTP.  Section 2.4 describes QoS (Quality of Service) improvements to the 
data link layer that are currently implemented in IEEE 802.11e standard [20].  Section 2.5 
describes how to transmit keys for the purpose of encrypting the real-time traffic.  Section 2.6 
describes how authentication, integrity and replay protection schemes are enabled by the keyed-
hash message authentication code.  Section 2.7 describes how the AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard) is used to encrypt the real-time content.  Section 2.8 describes how the block cipher 
modes of operation use AES to secure a stream of real-time traffic.  Section 2.9 describes how the 
(MOS) Mean Opinion Scores are obtained and how they relate to the quality of the audio and 
video traffic.  Section 2.10 describes related research initiatives for determining the capacity of 
wireless audio-video systems.  Section 2.11 summarizes the results of the literature review. 
 
2.1 Session Initialization Protocol 
 SIP (Session Initialization Protocol) is an application layer protocol that can use either 
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) or TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) to establish, modify and 
terminate sessions.  It was initially developed by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) 
MMUSIC (Multiparty Multimedia Session Control) committee in 1999.  The RFC (Request for 
 5
 Comments) that describes the protocol is RFC 3261, which has been in its current form since 
2002.   
 Figure 1 describes how SIP can be used to setup a simple media session between two 
UAs (User Agents).  Within both the initialization and termination packets, additional 
information about the session is communicated using the SDP (Session Description Protocol).   
 
 
Figure 1.  SIP Overview [28] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traditional voice communication systems developed within the phone industry consist of 
circuit switched networks.  Many of the signaling techniques used by the telephone industry were 
adopted by the first standard for implementing voice services over IP-based networks - H.323.  
Development and maintenance of this standard is coordinated by the ITU-T (International 
Telecommunications Union).  A major design philosophy that H.323 derives from traditional  
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 telecommunications systems is the concept that two users are connected by a “call” between 
handsets.  This assumes that typical communication scenarios consist of two end-points, which 
does not easily support many users’ expectation of a teleconference capability.  For this reason, 
implementations of the H.323 standard that provides teleconference capability generally take 
longer to develop, are more complicated to develop, and more difficult to maintain when 
compared with SIP implementations. 
 SIP uses a design philosophy based around the concept of a “session” which has resulted 
in implementations of multi-party conference capabilities.  Additionally, events related to the 
“session” can be coordinated before the start and end of media transmissions which greatly 
improves user satisfaction with the final implementation.  Events that could occur before or after 
the start of media transmission can include session description information such as the type of 
media to be transferred, security settings, number of users or application-specific information.   
 A major concern that must be addressed in regard to implementation of multimedia 
capabilities is how the voice components work with more traditional PSTNs (Public Switched 
Telephone Networks).  Many gateway implementations support the integration of PSTN with SIP 
or H.323 standards.  Additionally, hardware plug-ins for the hosting workstation are readily 
available.  It is also possible to connect a wireless AP (Access Point) to a voice gateway 
workstation through a LAN (Local Area Network) to enable wireless voice capability.    
 Figure 2 illustrates the scope of the two families of protocols used for real-time 
communication – H.323 and SIP.  The SIP Architecture contains a protocol named SIP which can 
use either TCP or UDP in the transport layer of an IP packet.  Several components of the two 
architectures are in common such as RTP (Real-Time Protocol) packets which contain the audio 
and video information [35] [43].  RTP is discussed in detail in Section 2.2.  An additional 
protocol that support SIP is RTCP (RTP Control Protocol), which is used to ensure that all 
endpoints have common variables related to the status and quality of the connections is common 
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 to both architectures.  Since RTP traffic must arrive in a reasonable time frame or not at all, the 
UDP protocol was chosen for the transport layer since it is not necessary to retransmit a packet if 
a loss occurs within the network.  MEGACO and H.248 were developed jointly by ITU-T and 
IETF and are used for gateway control [34].  However, multiple streams are handled in different 
ways by the two architectures through two different protocols H.245 and RTSP (Real-Time 
Streaming Protocol).   
Figure 2.  H.323 and SIP Architectures 
 
Additional terminology is required to explain implementation of SIP in modern 
applications.  The hardware device that a UA (user agent) runs on is named a SIP Terminal.  
Since each UA is required to be both a client and server, it is necessary to disambiguate by 
naming the UA that initiates a session the UAC (User Agent Client) and the UA that acts as the 
responder the UAS (User Agent Server).  Modern implementations have proxy servers that each 
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 UA communicates with.  An outgoing proxy is associated with the UAC, and an incoming proxy 
is associated with a UAS.  Additionally, the server may or may not read the content of the SDP 
(Session Description Protocol).  SDP describes the characteristics of the session, and its details 
are explained at the end of this section.  If SDP state is maintained by the proxy, it is called a 
stateful proxy server, and if it is not retained, the proxy is a stateless proxy server.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Scaleable SIP Session Initialization [25] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 displays a possible infrastructure that can support a scaleable SIP wireless 
solution.  It is possible that both the UAC and UAS are wireless devices that communicate 
through an AP that is connected to a proxy server.  In order to do a lookup for the inbound proxy 
server, it is necessary for a DNS Server be associated with the outbound proxy server.  An 
INVITE message is sent first to the outgoing proxy server.  Next, the INVITE is sent to the 
incoming proxy server with the assistance of an IP address supplied by the DNS server.  After the 
location server responds with the current address of the UAS, the inbound proxy server forwards 
the INVITE message.  Three messages are returned to the UAC in this scenario: the inbound 
proxy server responds with a 100 Trying message after receiving the INVITE; the UAS responds 
with a 180 Ringing message after receiving the INVITE; and a 200 OK is transmitted after the 
multimedia session has been accepted by the user operating the UAS.   
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 A registrar server must be present to allow the UA to update their current IP address to be 
stored by the location server.  Updating a location server consists of only two SIP commands.  
The REGISTER command is sent from the UA to the registrar server, and a 200 OK is replied 
once the registrar server has successfully updated the location server.  The Update and Response 
messages are typically proprietary protocols used by hardware manufacturers such as Cisco.  
 
Figure 4.  Registration with Location Server [25] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There exists many legitimate security concerns regarding the use of location servers.  For 
this reason, it is important that the location server verify the identity of all users attempting to 
retrieve location information.  Additionally, robust policies must be in place to map who is 
allowed access to the location of users who have accounts on the location server.  Additionally, it 
may be necessary to add time and location rules in addition to generic data access rights.  The 
advantages of a location server include that a particular user maintains a single SIP URI 
(Universal Resource Identifier), which contains the essential information to attempt the initiation 
of a session with the associated user.  A rough analogy is that a URI is to multimedia sessions as 
email address is to email.  Additionally, the use of a location server is a scaleable solution since 
each UAC that corresponds with the UAS does not need to be updated.   
Another protocol that was briefly discussed in Figure 2 is the Real Time Streaming 
Protocol (RTSP) which serves the purpose of opening and closing a media stream.  This 
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 capability is similar to a HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) session, however, the RTSP 
protocol is more flexible in that it allows the UAS or UAC to initiate requests for media streams 
opening or closing.  Additionally, HTTP does not maintain the state of the connection that it 
manages.  RTSP maintains state during the entire period the media stream is active, allowing 
parameters to be maintained without rebuilding the connection. 
As stated before, SIP relies on the SDP for a large portion of the content passed in SIP 
messages [3].  Supported session description settings include lip synchronization (LS), flow 
identification, and specific audio/video codecs.  Since it is common that multiple streams exist 
within one session, it is desirable to distinguish between group attributes and stream attributes.  
An example of how SDP can be used to initialize a session is in Figure 5.  Line 1 states that for 
all streams in the group, lip synchronization should occur.  Line 2 states that the primary stream is  
the audio channel on port 30000; the “RTP/AVP 0” value indicates that the RTP (Real Time 
Protocol) should transport Attribute Value Pair (AVP) 0.  When a lookup is conducted on AVP 0, 
it is discovered that it is referring to G.711 audio codec [23].  Lines 3 and 5 define the media 
identification values (mid) which are defined in lines 4 and 6 respectively.  Line 4 describes the 
video codec (H.261) and port number (30002) to be used in a manner similar to Line 2.   
1 a=group:LS 1 2 
2 m=audio 30000 RTP/AVP 0 
3 a=mid:1 
4 m=video 30002 RTP/AVP 31 
5 a=mid:2 
6 m=audio 30004 RTP/AVP 0  
Figure 5. Session Description Protocol Example [29] 
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 2.2 Real Time Protocol 
 The actual transmission of the voice data is conducted within RTP (Real Time Protocol) 
packets.  For this reason, to understand the performance and security of the voice stream, a 
thorough investigation must be made of the structure of the RTP packet.  Figure 6 illustrates that 
20 bytes are used in the header for the IPv4 header.  Since the packet uses the UDP because of the 
real-time nature of the broadcast, 8 bytes are added for the UDP header.  Finally, the RTP header 
consists of a minimum of 12 bytes.  Also, the codec block size varies greatly depending on the 
exact audio/video codec used.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  RTP Packet Structure [29] 
 
 RTP packets are generally sent every 20μs.  This amount of time was chosen because a 
human is barely be able to detect the absence of 20μs of audio content.  Unacceptable network 
congestion can also be caused by sending too many RTP packets.  For this reason, it is possible 
that the codec data may actually be fewer bytes in size than the header.  For instance, if the G.729 
audio codec [24] is used instead, the size of the codec information that exists within one RTP 
packet is 20 bytes, or half the size of the header.  
 There are many considerations for real-time application data that need not be considered 
in typical TCP traffic.  Among two of the most important aspects that must be considered is the 
order and time in which an individual packet arrives. For this reason, it is necessary that the RTP 
packet contain both timestamp and sequence number.  These two attributes also ensure that the 
UAS receiving the real-time traffic knows the difference between lost packets and time-periods in 
which the UAC did not send data because the user was not speaking.  It should be noted that 
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 when there exists either silence because a packet has been delayed in the network, most 
implementations play white noise instead of silence for sound quality reasons. 
 One of the most serious problems with highly loaded networks supporting real-time data 
is variations in delay.  This phenomenon is called jitter.  Humans can detect a wobbling sound in 
the audio stream if jitter is not handled by the UAS.  It is now common practice to implement a 
jitter buffer that only sends the audio data to hardware once the timer associated with the buffer 
has expended.  An additional concern is that of clock synchronization between the two SIP 
applications.  The total time to send the voice data to the receiver can thus be characterized as the 
sum of audio collection time, local clock synchronization time, UAS packaging delay, network 
delay, and UAC jitter-buffer delay.  An additional constraint on the real-time multimedia 
application is that it must ensure that the total delay incurred must be less than 177ms, as above 
this range, humans begin to notice that a delay is occurring in the audio channel [17].   
 The exact composition of the RTP header as described in RFC 1889 is shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 6 illustrated 12 bytes of mandatory RTP header content; however Figure 7 illustrates an 
extra 32-bit word.  The extra 32-bit word is used identify extra contributing sources beyond the 
synchronization source.  The header of the RTP packet shown in Figure 7 consists of a version 
number (VER), a flag to indicate whether padding exists (P), a flag to indicate that this packet is 
an extension (X), the number of contributing sources to the stream (CC – Contributing Source 
Count), a marker to indicate a major change in the data stream ea. a period of talking after a 
period of silence (M), a type of payload that was defined in SDP in the session initialization 
(PTYPE), a sequence number for the packet, a timestamp, and a list of all IP addresses that 
contributed to the content of the packet.   
 13
  
Figure 7.  RTP Header Structure [29] 
 
Another protocol that is often implemented in real-time multimedia applications is the 
RTP Control Protocol (RTCP).  The purpose of this protocol is to ensure that both UAs have a 
common understanding of the network conditions.  Examples of how this information may be 
used by the application include modifying the codec or adjusting the rate of sent into the network.  
Mandatory fields within RTCP include a version number, a flag for the existence of padding, a 
report count that must equal or exceed two, a type of payload, the length of all reports, followed 
by the actual payload.  The actual payload is made up of a series of reports, most typically both a 
receiver and sender report are sent by both UAs.  These reports contain the information needed 
for each UA to communicate the loss rate, discard rate, burst duration, gap duration, round trip 
delay, end system delay, noise lever, and jitter buffer size that the other UA need to control the 
real-time stream.  
 
2.3 Audio Codecs 
Packaging the voice data within the RTP packets can be described by using two specific 
audio codecs.  G.711 is a frequently used codec because it does not significantly compress the 
audio which results in high voice quality, but with the drawback of a high bandwidth requirement 
[20].  G.729 allows a compression of the voice data resulting in a lower quality than G.711, 
however, it is available at 1/3 of the bandwidth of a G.711 codec [24].   
 The technology enabling G.711 is Pulse Code Modulation (PCM).  Since humans 
measure the tone of sound logarithmically, PCM compresses sound logarithmically.  It allows a  
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 of the human.  The law typically used in implementations of PCM within the United States is 
known as the mu-Law [19] and is:  
             
                                    )                                               (1)         
)1ln(
)1
u
ux
+
ln(y +=  
 
where u = 255 and the value to compress is set as the value x, the value y is the resulting value. 
G.729 uses CELP (Code Excited Linear Prediction) to compress the data which takes 
advantage of the fact that human speech can be modeled as a series of shapes of frequency or 
“formants” at a particular pitch [24].  By matching a particular excitation vector to the formant of 
the word that was spoken, and by matching the pitch to one of eight possible values, a significant 
compression is possible with little loss of audio content.  A total of 10 bytes is all that is 
encapsulated in the RTP packet.  The 10 bytes contain a representation of one of the 128 
excitation vectors along with one of eight pitch frequencies.   
A pitch synthesis filter is used to determine the correct combination of pitch and 
excitation vectors.  Several variables need to be defined before the CELP pitch synthesis filter in 
Figure 8 can be described.  The pitch of the signal is “G” and the excitation vector is “x(i)(n)”.  
Together, they are known as the scaled codeword and compared with the input speech s(n).  Two 
filters to determine the pitch and formant are referred to as P(z) and H(z) respectively.   A 
weighting filter uses a constant γ = 1.25 for ensuring that the gain is not related to the error 
between the input speech and the scaled codeword.   
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 Figure 8.  CELP Pitch Synthesis Filter [42] 
2.4 Wireless Quality of Service Options 
 The final quality of the signal that is experienced by the end user is affected by not only 
the type of codec, but also by the quality of the network connection.  Due to the high sensitivity 
of real-time multimedia to delays and packet losses within the network, the data link layer is 
highly important as any delays resulting from inefficiencies in terms of packet losses and packet 
delays cannot be made up in transport or application layer changes.  For this reason, much effort 
has been expended to ensure that the IEEE 802.11 family of protocols provides a high quality of 
service (QoS).  For example, use of the PCF (Point Coordination Function) protocol allows a 
contention-free period to allow the access point (AP) to poll each station to determine how the 
rest of the contention free period is used.  Since the PCF has numerous limitations, HCF (Hybrid 
Coordination Function) was developed under the IEEE 802.11e standard [20].  Enhanced 
Distributed Coordination Function (EDCA) is one of the two modes under which HCF can 
function to provide QoS.  EDCA allows the distinction of classes of traffic, in addition to 
providing a transmission opportunity (TXOP) for each station to send as many frames as possible.  
HCF Controlled Channel Access (HCCA) is the second HCF mode that has the benefits of both 
EDCA and PCF combined to make it the most advanced protocol, allowing customization of the 
quality of each of the streams within the WLAN.  However, only the EDCA mode is mandatory 
in the 802.11e standard.   
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 2.5 Key Distribution Methods 
The issue of security of the multimedia traffic is a highly important variable to consider 
when deploying real-time multimedia capabilities.  The currently accepted method of securing 
multimedia traffic is defined in RFC 3711 [36].  The Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol 
(SRTP) was defined in March of 2004 to secure the RTP against multiple attacks on the 
application layer [15].  Specific defenses that SRTP provides include encryption of the data 
stream, authentication, and protection of both the integrity and replay ability of the message.  
Additionally, SRTP provides for both the unicast and multicast modes so that no capability of 
RTP is lost.  However, it should be noted that SRTP does not specify how keys should be 
distributed to the final clients.   
Since key distribution is not standardized, yet required for secure multimedia, there are a 
number of implementations in use [33].  The simplest method for key distribution is simply 
defining the key values of the multimedia session inside the SIP message using SDES (Session 
Description Protocol Security).  This method was formally published in RFC 4568 which was 
published in July 2006 [3].  SDES states that the binary key should be encoded in base-64 so that 
it is compliant with the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) as described in the 
Session Description Protocol (SDP).  Since no security for the key exists in the application layer 
unless S/MIME is used, this is at best a temporary solution for allowing the SRTP to get critical 
mass within industry.  Another major reason for implementation of SDES is the performance of 
the applications that use SDES for key distribution is greatly improved; making capabilities such 
as push-to-talk seem more natural to the end user.   
 An additional option for enabling key distribution is the Multimedia Internet KEYing 
(MIKEY) technique that was published in RFC 3830 in August of 2004 [5]. Three techniques 
exist for distributing keys as specified in the protocol; providing a pre-shared key before the 
SRTP session begins, using a public key distribution system, or implementing the Diffie-Hellman 
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 security approach.  The obvious problem with the pre-shared key is that each client must have a 
series of keys for all of the other clients in the network.  This solution does not scale with large 
networks, and is not used with regularity.  Use of a public key distributed using a PKI (Public 
Key Infrastructure) is another possibility that has seen use in many DoD (Department of  
Defense) organizations through the efforts of Defense Information Security Agency (DISA).  
Finally, there exists the Diffie-Hellman technique for key distribution.  Since this final option of 
Diffie-Hellman is a solution that scales without a high overhead cost, it is examined in detail in 
this section. 
 To describe how Diffie-Hellman works in relation to two users, it is best to define the 
two client stations as Alice and Bob as can be seen in Figure 9.  A prerequisite to the Diffie-
Hellman exchange requires that each of the two users determine their own private key before the 
exchange begins.  After Alice has her key and two other public values, g and p, she calculates A 
= g^a mod p using her private key a.  She next sends her calculated value, A, to Bob with the 
values g and p.  Bob calculates his own public value using the g and p value given by Alice in 
addition to the shared secret by calculating K = A^b mod p.  Bob sends his calculated value B = 
g^b mod p to Alice, so that she in turn can solve K = B^a mod p.  In this way, both Alice and Bob 
have negotiated a shared key for the data encryption.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Diffie-Hellman Key Distribution 
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  A major flaw of the Diffie-Hellman Exchange is a vulnerability to a man-in-the-middle 
attack [28][49].  Specifically, if an intruder exists that is able to intercept both Alice and Bob's 
messages; the intruder has access to the key for the data encryption.  For this example, Carol is 
the intruder.  When Alice inadvertently sends her calculated value A to Carol, Carol uses the g 
and p values to calculate her value C.  Carol sends C back to Alice, in this way ensuring that 
Alice and she are sharing a common key.  In the same way, Carol sends the value C along with g 
and p to Bob who shares a second key with Carol.  In this way, Carol uses two keys, one to 
unencrypt Alice's messages and one to unencrypt Bob's messages.   
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Diffie-Hellman 
A solution was proposed in March of 2006 that would eliminate the man-in-the-middle 
attack through use of a series of shared secrets.  This solution is ZRTP (Zimmerman RTP) [50] 
which was named after founder Phillip Zimmerman in an internet draft.  ZRTP is essentially 
secure unless the intruder was present for all sessions between the two UAs.  A series of shared 
secrets between the two clients is determined and maintained to ensure that no man-in-the-middle 
attack is occurring.  Specifically, each client has its own ZRTP ID value that it shares with other 
clients and additional side-channel signaling is supported in the protocol.  Also, ZRTP relies on 
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) capability to allow a double Diffie-Hellman 
message exchange to ensure that both of the clients authenticate one another's message.  Only 
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 after successful completion of the second Diffie-Hellman exchange is it possible for a SRTP 
session to begin. 
Details for implementation of the ZRTP protocol are shown in Figure 11.  A RTP session 
must already be in existence for the start of the ZRTP exchange.  Also, the ultimate product of the 
exchange is a SRTP session.  The value “ver” stands for the implementation version.  “cid” 
represents the client’s ID which is used for a lookup of the public key; it is associated with a 
particular software installation.  “hash” represents which hash algorithm is used for 
authentication.  “cipher” represents the type of cipher that is used in the SRTP session; generally, 
this is the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard).  “pkt” represents the public key type; this value 
is represents the length of the key and is usually either 128 or 256 bits.  “sas” represents an 
optional short authentication string that can be used within the exchange to further secure the 
session.  “ZID” represents the ID of the user.  These six variables are transmitted in the first two 
phases of the exchange to allow a secure Diffie-Hellman exchange in the final two phases of the 
ZRTP protocol exchange.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Zimmerman’s Solution to Diffie-Hellman Vulnerability 
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 The information to be used in the SRTP session is passed in the “srtps” value, which 
represents a hash algorithm on the combined string of the SRTP key and salt.  “sigs” represents 
the signaling secret which is generated by use of the hash algorithm on the combined string of the 
call-id, as well as the local and remote tags, all of which are used in the SIP layer.   “pvr” and 
“pvi” represent a session-specific secret that should be used to secure the “srtps” value.  These 
values are calculated by the expression: g^svr mod p.  Where g and p are public values and svr is 
a randomly chosen number for this session.  “rs1” and “rs2 represent out of band secrets, which 
can be used to further secure the “srtps” value.  If the out of band values are not available, 
random numbers are used instead.   
 
2.6 Authentication, Integrity and Replay Protection  
The hash algorithm has already been discussed in the implementation of the ZRTP 
protocol; however it is being defined in this section of the thesis.  In addition to the ZRTP 
protocol, SRTP specifies that the keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) be used to 
enable authentication, integrity and replay protection capability.  HMAC functions by combining 
both the key and the m
 
  
where the first s
essage in one block [7].  The procedure is:   
tep is to conduct an XOR function with K (the key) and the inside pad “ipad” 
defined as “0x3636...”.  After concatenating the result with the message “m”, the term can be 
 of several hash algorithms to be discussed below.  This hashed result is 
t; 
er, the 
choice of which hash algorithm to implement has a significant effect on the ultimate security of  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )mipadKhopadKhmHMACK |||| ⊕⊕=              (2) 
hashed using one
concatenated with the XOR result of the key, K and the outside pad “opad,” which is a constan
“0x5c5c…”.  Finally, a second hash occurs over the entire result.   
 Definition of the hash algorithm is not present in the HMAC specification; howev
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 the HMAC algorithm.  Understanding of how the hash algorithm functions requires knowledge 
that the hash algorithm produces a fixed sized “digest” for each message input.  Despite how 
small the change to the initial input, the digest varies by seemingly random change.  A widely 
implemented hash function is the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) – 1, which uses a 160 bit digest 
for securing the message and key [12].  However, Vincent Rijmen (one of the inventers of the 
Advanced Encryption Standard), published a paper in 2005 describing an attack on SHA-1 [38]. 
For this reason, SHA-1 should not be used as the hash algorithm for HMAC.  As of April 2007, 
digest lengths from 224 to 512 bits as specified in the SHA-2 family of algorithms do not have 
published attacks.   It should also be noted that a salt is needed for generation of the hash value in 
SHA.  It is possible to pass that salt value through a ZRTP procedure or send it by SIP messaging 
using SDES.  
2.7 Advanced Encryption Standard   
The SRTP defines AES [1] (Advanced Encryption Standard) to encrypt the data stream.  
AES was defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the US 
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) in Publication 197 in November of 2001.  The 
AES standard is largely based on a protocol that was submitted by Joan Daemen and Vincent 
Rijmen under the name Rijndael.  AES differs from the Rijndael algorithm by stating that the key 
size is limited to 128, 192 or 256 bits, whereas the Rijndael standard uses any multiple of 16 bits 
between 128 and 256 bits.  The block size of the algorithm is limited to 128 bits; however, the 
blocks can be used in one of several modes of operation to extend the length of the message to be 
encrypted.  SRTP defines either the counter method or output feedback stream ciphers for use in 
encrypting RTP packets, which is discussed following the method for securing a block of 
information. 
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  Figure 12.  Building a 256-bit Key in Four Steps using the AES Key Schedule 
The blocks are encrypted in several rounds; the exact number of rounds depends on the 
key size chosen (e.g. 256 bits for 14 rounds).  The Rijndeal key schedule requires four steps to 
determine all values within the needed key size [11].  These four steps and the relationship to 
each rounds’ key is show in Figure 12.  On the first round, the first four bytes of the first key are 
generated by performing an operation called the key schedule core on the first four bytes of the 
original key.  A visual description of the core procedure is available in Figure 13.  The key 
schedule core’s first step is to rotate the eight bits (a byte) to the left.  Next, the Rijndael S-box 
operation occurs four times to the shifted 256 bit sequence.  The Rijndael S-box function is 
essentially a table lookup, as can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. Rijndael S-Box [11] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the final step of the key schedule core, an xor operation is completed using the left 
most byte with a value called the “rcon”.  The “rcon” value increases in each key schedule 
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 iteration by a value of 2^i in the Rijndael Finite Field [6], where i increments on each pass 
through the key schedule core throughout the key schedule process by a value of one.  The 
calculated value in the Rijndael finite field is based on input i is the sum i^8 + i^4 + i^3 + i + 1.   
   
 
Figure 13.  AES Core Procedure for Key Generation 
The second step is iterated three times, to generate 12 bytes.  The first iteration xors the 
four bytes that were used in the key schedule core process with the four bytes that are the product 
of the AES core procedure to generate four bytes.  The second iteration xors the product of the 
core procedure with the product of the first iteration of the second step to generate four bytes.  
The third iteration xors the product of the first iteration with the product of the second iteration to 
generate the last four bytes of the second step.    
Step three adds another four bytes by conducting the S-Box lookup on the 5th four byte word of 
the original key and xor’ing the result with the four byte product of the third iteration of the 
second step.   
 24
 The final 12 bytes are created by iterating through the fourth phase of the process.  The 
first iteration xors the 5th four byte word of the original key with the four byte product of third 
step to generate four bytes.  The second iteration xors the product of the third step with the 
product of the first iteration to generate four bytes.  The third iteration xors the product of the first 
step with the product of the second step to generate the last four bytes of the third step.        
 After completion of the key scheduling procedure, iterations through the block 
using each of the keys generated in the key schedule can be completed using the AES procedure 
[1].  A visual description of this procedure is provided in Figures 14-17 [2].  The first step of a 
round in AES is to xor each byte of the block with the key as shown in Figure 14.   
 
Figure 14.  AES Encryption Step One [2] 
The second round uses each byte of the output of the first step as the input to an S-Box 
lookup to generate the output values as shown in Figure 15.  The third step shifts the output bytes 
of step two left as shown in Figure 16.  The second row gets shifted by one byte to the left, the 
third row by two bytes, and the fourth by three bytes.  The fourth step performs the following 
calculations to each of the output block rows based on the equation 
 r0 = 2a0 + a3 + a2 + 3a1 
r1 = 2a1 + a0 + a3 + 3a2 
r2 = 2a2 + a1 + a0 + 3a3 
r3 = 2a3 + a2 + a1 + 3a0   
(3) 
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 where ai is an individual byte within a column as can be seen in Figure 17.  The resulting ri values 
are the final output bytes.  After completion of all 14 rounds, the output block is encrypted with 
the 256-bit key. 
 
Figure 15.  AES Encryption Step Two [2] 
 
 
Figure 16.  AES Encryption Step Three [2] 
 
 
Figure 17.  AES Encryption Step Four [2] 
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 2.8 Block Cipher Modes of Operation for Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol 
 A further complexity to consider when implementing SRTP, which must account for 
streams of data, is how to work with multiple blocks without a change in the key.  SRTP suggests 
one of two methods be used for the block cipher modes of operation - segmented integer counter 
mode (CTR) or an altered form of the output feedback mode (OFB).  In order to use both of these 
modes it is required that both a key and salt be supplied by either SDES in SIP messaging or 
through ZRTP session initialization [8].    
Segmented integer counter mode (CTR) is the default for AES stream encryption.  CTR 
is differentiated by use of an initialization vector (IV) that increments so that no repeats occur in a 
short time.  The IV is first encrypted by use of the key using the AES algorithm; this is shown in 
Figure 18 as a “block cipher encryption”.  It is then be xor’ed with the plaintext data stream to 
produce the enciphered data stream that can be packaged within an RTP packet and sent to the 
destination.   
A second method for encrypting the data stream is through use of an IV that never 
increments; this process is called the output feedback mode (OFB).  As seen in Figure 19, OFB 
functions by taking the IV, enciphering it using the AES algorithm, and then xor’ing it with the 
plaintext data stream before packaging it inside an RTP packet.  The pattern is repeated by 
reprocessing the enciphered IV through the AES algorithm a second time and then xor’ing with 
the plaintext stream to generate the contents of the second RTP packet. 
 
 Figure 18.  Counter (CTR) Mode Encryption [7] 
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 Figure 19.  Output Feedback (OFB) Mode Encryption [8] 
 
2.9 Methods for obtaining MOS (Mean Opinion Score) 
 Proper analysis of the multimedia connection requires a well-established method for 
obtaining perceived quality.  One of the methods for obtaining MOS is the use of human subjects 
to subjectively rate the quality on a scale from one (bad or unusable) to 5 (excellent) [26].  
Another way to interpret the results of this study is from the point of view of the impairment that 
the conditions provide.  Table 2 illustrates the relationship between the numerical value and the 
quality or impairment that was experienced by the users.  Another possible method for testing the 
quality of the signal is use includes the ITU (International Telecommunications Union) P.862 
PESQ (Perceptual Evaluation of Speech Quality) [14] or the E-Model [45].  The E-Model uses 
the rate of packets loss, delay, as well as the inherent codec weaknesses to predict the score that 
would be obtained if the human subject data was instead collected.  The output of an E-Model is 
generally reported in terms of the R-Value which is an integer from 0 (bad) to 100 (excellent). 
Table 2. MOS Quality and Impairment Numerical Relationship [29] 
MOS Quality Impairment R-Value 
4.5 Excellent Imperceptible 90 
4.0 Very Good Perceptible, but not annoying 80 
3.5 Good Very slightly annoying 70 
3.0 Fair Slightly annoying 60 
2.5 Poor Annoying 50 
1.0 Bad Very annoying 0 
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For comparison with the results that are analyzed in Chapter IV, the MOS scores of 
several codecs are shown in Table 3.  The G.711 standard is used in this thesis since it has the 
highest MOS score.   
 Table 3. MOS Scores of Various Codecs [29] 
Codec (data rate) Mean Opinion Score (MOS) 
G.711 (64 kbit/s) 4.1 
G.729 (8 kbit/s) 3.9 
G.723.1 (6.3 kbit/s) 3.9 
G.729a (8 kbit/s) 3.7 
G.723.1 (5.3 kbit/s) 3.7 
 
 
 
 
2.10 Related Research 
 Several analytical and computer-based models of wireless multimedia systems exist that 
can be compared to the results obtained in this thesis.  Additionally, existing data for wireless 
multimedia systems exist as well.  This section describes the various models and data sets.     
 Multiple models to describe the use of the wireless medium for purely voice traffic were 
developed before this study [10,13,16].  The model in [17] is given by 
transmit
vp
T
T
N =     
(4) 
where Tvp is the size in ms of the voice payload, and Ttransmit is the time involved in transmitting a 
packet.  The Ttransmit is further defined as 
                  ( ) ( )2/2 minCWTDIFSTSIFSTN slotackvoice ∗++++∗=  (5) 
where Tvoice is the time taken to transmit a packet, SIFS is the short inter frame space, Tack is the 
time for the receiver to acknowledge receipt of the packet, DIFS is the DCF inter frame space, 
TSLOT is the discrete wait interval length and CWMIN is the maximum number of intervals [27].   
Equations 4 and 5 are reformed in [44] using: 
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1             (6) 
where capacity (N) is a function of the sum of percents where each activity within a node is 
denoted by a percent of total capacity (Ti).  Activity Ti can be expressed as one of two types – 
back-off after the transmission of a packet and the actual transmission of a packet.   A possible 
activity that a node can be contributing to total network activity is engaging in back-off activity 
related to idle time in the network following the transmission of a packet.  The percent of network 
capacity expended by a single back-off procedure following the transmission of a type of packet 
is  
     ( )2MINSLOTMEDIABACKOFF CWTRT ×=          (7) 
where RMEDIA is the rate of real-time packets and the values TSLOT and CWMIN .  
Recommendations of the values to be used within equation 7 are in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Recommended Values for TBACKOFF Calculation 
Format Value Description 
RMEDIA 50 packets/sec Rate of Packets 
TSLOT 20 μs Discrete Wait Interval Length 
CWMIN 31 Max Number of Intervals 
A general expression for the percent of network capacity that is used by one type of 
media transmission is  
                             ( )DIFSTSIFSTRT ACKMEDIAMEDIATX +++= 2                 (8) 
where TMEDIA is the media transmission time of the RTP packet, SIFS is the short inter frame 
space, TACK is the time for the receiver to acknowledge receipt of the packet and DIFS is the DCF 
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 inter frame space [27].  Table 5 provides recommendations of audio and video values that can be 
used to calculate TTX.   
Table 5. Recommended Values for TTX Calculation 
Variable Audio Video Description 
RMEDIA 50 pkts/s 50 pkts/s Rate of packets 
TMEDIA 72.8 ms 158 ms Media Tx Time 
SIFS 10 ms 10 ms Inter frame Space 
TACK 41.2 ms 41.2 ms ACK Tx Time 
DIFS 50 ms 50 ms DCF Inter frame 
 
 The results of calculating the capacity of the network using Equations 6,7 and 8 with the 
values in Tables 4 and 5 is shown in Table 6.  The 176x144 Video Payload [47][48] condition is 
predicted to support 19 nodes, or 9 conversations.  Also, computer simulation data in [17] 
suggested that capacities of four conversations are possible in an 802.11b WLAN.   
 
Table 6.  Analytical Model of Audio-Video Capacity 
Number of Nodes on  
Screen Size (Pixels) 
802.11g WLAN 
128x96 Video Payload 20 
176x144 Video Payload 19 
320x240 Video Payload 14 
352x288 Video Payload 11 
352x480 Video Payload 3 
 
Analysis and simulation completed in [17] and [44] both made the assumption that packet 
loss rates are less than 3 percent.  However, empirical analysis in [40] has been demonstrated that 
the packet loss percentages in 802.11g WLANs often have loss rates greater than 50% over 
significant ( > 5 seconds) portions of an extended connection.   
Data in [40] was also related back to audio MOS scores through use of neural network 
designed to imitate human reaction to an audio signal.  The data suggests that there are 
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 continuous periods of fifteen seconds or more where the audio MOS is less than 2 out 5 (poor).  
This suggests that not a single VoIP conversation can occur on an 802.11g WLAN.   
 With such great differences in the wireless network literature regarding the capacity of 
802.11g to support voice and video traffic, it is reasonable to collect and analyze actual human 
subject data on the voice and video capacity available through a secure wireless system.   
  
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the current state of VoIP technology with special focus on current 
methods to secure the real-time traffic.  Section 2.1 discusses two families of protocols capable of 
providing voice and video services over IP networks - H.323 [25] and SIP.  Section 2.2 describes 
how RTP is used to transmit the data containing the real-time voice and video data.  Section 2.3 
describes how audio information is compressed so that it may be transmitted using RTP.  Section 
2.4 describes QoS improvements to the data link layer currently implemented in the IEEE 
802.11e standard.  Section 2.5 describes how to transmit keys for the purpose of encrypting the 
real-time traffic.  Section 2.6 describes how authentication, integrity and replay protection 
schemes are enabled by the keyed-hash message authentication code.  Section 2.7 describes how 
AES is used to encrypt the real-time content.  Section 2.8 describes how the block cipher modes 
of operation use AES to secure a stream of real-time traffic.  Section 2.9 describes how MOS are 
obtained and how they relate to the quality of the audio and video traffic.  Section 2.10 describes 
related research initiatives for determining the capacity of wireless audio-video systems.   
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III. Methodology 
 
 This chapter describes how the experiment is designed as well as the method to set up the 
laboratory software.   The two primary questions that are addressed in this chapter are: 1) Is there 
a statistically significant effect (> 95% chance that differences in the dependant variables result 
from manipulation of the factor) on the quality of the audio and video data by routing the traffic 
through an AP compared with two arbitrary nodes on a WLAN transmitting and receiving audio 
and video traffic?; and 2) Is there a statistically significant impact on the quality of the audio 
received by securing the audio traffic?  Section 3.1 describes the experimental design based on 
research goals.  Additionally, a method that was developed as part of this thesis effort to secure 
multimedia IP traffic when using Java applications is discussed in detail.  Section 3.2 describes 
the high level architecture of software that is used for collection of the human subject data.  
Section 3.3 describes how the wireless network is secured against network layer compromises of 
security.  Section 3.4 summarizes the methodology development that is explained within this 
chapter.    
 
3.1 Experimental Design 
Several effects of variables related to secure wireless multimedia are addressed in this 
thesis.  One of the variables manipulated during the course of the thesis experiment is whether the 
voice is secured.  The thesis experiment also is designed to determine how many voice and video 
connections are possible, and at what network conditions the signal quality degrades enough to 
become annoying to users of the system.  Also, the impact of sending the signal through an AP 
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 has as opposed to having two terminals on the same WLAN is part of the design of the thesis 
experiment.   
These research goals are answered by exposing subjects to several network conditions 
and then measuring the MOS (Mean Opinion Score) of the entire subject pool.  Since human 
subjects are used to understand the effect of different wireless multimedia configurations, an 
exemption of the subject protocol is obtained.  Since all of the subject data is collected in 
WPAFB Area B Bldg 190, which houses the Logistics Readiness Branch, (AFRL/HEAL) of the 
Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the exemption was sought through the AFRL process.  
Based on the paperwork required for the exemption process, a human subject consent letter 
(Appendix A) and an information form (Appendix B) are created.  The letters are signed to 
confirm that the subject has knowledge of their rights under the Privacy Act Laws.  Also, an 
information form is available for each subject to retain in their possession which informs the 
subject to the Privacy Act Laws regarding their participation in the study.   
 A possible confounding variable in the study is a possible existence of subjects 
that have moderate to severe hearing loss.  For this reason, all subjects have a short hearing 
screening test to ensure that all subjects have minimal (20 dB or less) hearing loss.  The Home 
Audiometer Hearing Test [18] is used to conduct the hearing screening test.  To begin the 
screening test the subject is shown how to manipulate the joystick to indicate they hear the sounds 
created by the Home Audiometer Hearing Test. 
A list of the different network conditions that the thesis software produces is detailed in 
Table 7.  As an example of how to read the descriptions in Table 7, the network condition two is 
defined as two-way stream flowing from the laptop through an AP to the subject.  Figure 20 
illustrates the network conditions that are listed in Table 7.  Network conditions three and four 
within the audio and video media type are excluded because the multimedia signal was 
unquestionably unusable. 
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Three of the four variables in the experiment are within-subject variables, meaning that 
the factors are experienced at different levels by each of the subjects.  As an example, the use of 
video factor is experienced in the on and off levels by each subject.  For this reason, the use of 
video is a within-subject variable.  Additionally, the number of active conversation and use of the 
AP are within-subject variables.  The remaining factor is the use of security because one subject 
in the study either experienced the secure audio stream or did not.  For this reason, the two levels 
of the factor were only different between subjects; therefore, it is referred to as a between-subject 
variable.  The reason that the use of security factor is a between-subject variable is that the 
experiment was initially envisioned to either have a secure wireless network (with WPA 
encryption) or an open wireless network to compare the effects, which could not have been easily 
reconfigured during a subject run.  However, in the final iteration of the software it is possible to 
turn the security feature on and off instantaneously.   
All human subjects are first exposed to the audio only conditions, which consist of six 
network conditions as described in Table 7 and illustrated in Figure 20.  After exposure to the 
audio signal, the software prompts the user rate perceived quality of the audio sample.  Next, the 
subjects are exposed to the video conditions in the same order as in the audio conditions as shown  
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Figure 20. Network Conditions 
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 in Table 7.    The subjects are then prompted by the software to evaluate both the audio and video 
in terms of perceived quality.  Once the human subject has provided inputs to both values, the  
 
Figure 20. Network Conditions (continued) 
subject presses the “OK” button to continue to the next network condition.  
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 To determine the correct number of subjects to use in the study, this equation was used 
  2
2
2
δ
σ
azn ≈       (9) 
where n is the appropriate number of subjects za represents the appropriate deviation for mean for 
the 95% confidence interval which is evaluated to be 1.96.  The σ2 is the expected standard 
deviation of the sample data set (0.9) and δ is half the size of the final confidence interval (.1) 
[32].  The needed number of subjects is evaluated at thirty six.    
All thirty-six subjects are randomly assigned to one of these twelve different conditions 
to ensure that the experimenter does not provide a confounding variable related to the order and 
treatment of the subjects.  Six of these conditions use a secure voice connection, and six of these 
conditions do not use the secure feature.  In order to ensure that there exist no ordering effects 
among the network conditions, the order of the network conditions is counterbalanced over the 
six different network configurations.  Figure 21 illustrates an approximate view of how the user 
interface for the MOS evaluation appears.   
 
Figure 21.  Software User Interface for Audio/Video MOS 
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 In numerical order, the conditions include:  
1) A human subject sending and receiving a real-time signal with a laptop connected by 
Ethernet to the AP.  
2) A human subject sending and receiving a real-time signal with a laptop connected by 
Ethernet to the AP, while at the same time the same laptop connected by Ethernet to the AP is 
sending and receiving one additional signal with a third laptop on the WLAN.   
3) A human subject sending and receiving a real-time signal with a laptop connected by 
Ethernet to the AP, while at the same time the laptop connected by Ethernet to the AP is sending 
and receiving two additional signals to a third and fourth laptop on the WLAN.   
4) A human subject sending and receiving a real-time signal with a laptop connected by 
Ethernet to the AP, while at the same time the laptop connected by Ethernet to the AP is sending 
and receiving three additional signals to a third, fourth and fifth laptops on the WLAN.   
5) A human subject sending and receiving a real-time signal with a laptop on the same 
WLAN.   
6) A human subject sending and receiving a real-time signal with a laptop on the same 
WLAN, while at the same time a two additional laptops on the network are sending and receiving 
a real-time signal to one another.   
For the audio conditions, all six network configurations are used.  However, for the video 
conditions, the third and fourth network conditions are not evaluated.  These two network 
conditions were eliminated from study since it was discovered during the initial software 
development that there exists unusually poor quality of the video due to technology limitations in 
the 802.11g wireless networks.  The unevaluated perceived video quality of these two network 
conditions is often poor enough that no video can be successfully received, or just a few frames 
arrive in the time space of fifteen seconds.   
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 One of the problems when using human subject data is that there may be ordering effects 
in the data set [5].  Ordering effects occur when the subject rates the perceived quality of a audio 
or video stream based partially on their exposure to an earlier audio or video stream.  To mitigate 
the ordering effect, it will be necessary to use a counterbalancing design to ensure that the order 
in which the streams were presented to the subject did not affect the perceived quality rating.  To 
produce a counterbalanced design, a Latin square must be used to ensure that each of the six 
network condition is administered equally in the six possible conditions.  A Latin square is 
produced by filling a n x n table with n different symbols in such a way that each symbols occurs 
exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column.  When these six network conditions 
are counterbalanced into six different conditions using a six by six Latin square, the ordering of 
the network conditions is:  
1)  1,2,6,3,5,4   
2)  2,3,1,4,6,5  
3)  3,4,2,5,1,6   
4)  4,5,3,6,2,1   
5)  5,6,4,1,3,2  
6)  6,1,5,2,4,3.   
Table 8 illustrates the order in which each of the network conditions is the network 
conditions are applied consistently with a counterbalanced design.  Since the use of security 
Table 8. Subject Treatments 
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 features is a between subject variable only half of the subject will have the treatment.  Subjects 
who have a treatment marked in bold within the table indicate that the subject should be exposed 
to secure audio. Items in italics indicate that for the speech intelligibility section of the 
experiment a combined audio-video signal is used for the first twenty rhyming words in the final 
step.  The second set of twenty rhyming words use an audio-only stream.  However, if the item is 
not italicized, this indicates that the first twenty rhyming words in the final step are transmitted 
with an audio-only signal.  The second set of twenty rhyming words is then transmitted with a 
combined audio-video signal. 
During the final step of the experimental procedure, the subjects listen to twenty different 
words over the connection in either the audio-only or combined audio-video condition based on 
whether the item is italicized.  For the second set of twenty rhyming words, the subject will listen 
to the opposite condition as the first twenty words.  For each rhyming word that is spoken over 
the connection, the subject will match the word that was said to one of six words that are shown 
on a user interface as illustrated in Figure 22.  Halfway through the list of words that are to be 
sent over the connection, a two-way video connection is to be created or destroyed, based on the 
assignments in Table 8.   
 
 
Figure 22.  Software User Interface for Audio Intelligibilty 
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 3.2 Architecture of Experimental Software 
 To conduct the experiment, a research platform is developed that is capable of providing 
both a secure and unsecure real-time audio and video signal from a remote terminal.  Since the 
research platform is unique to this thesis, it is appropriate to describe in detail the development of 
the underlying software. 
As is discussed in the background chapter of this thesis, a two-layered application is 
generally considered the best design for VoIP-type capability.  One of the layers uses the Real-
Time Protocol (RTP) to send and receive the data related to video or audio.  Another layer is 
referred to as the top layer and controls the RTP-stream in the lower layer.  The top layer 
performs such functions as the stopping and starting of transmission, and the logging on and off 
users.  The type of data sent within the RTP packets is also communicated between clients at this 
level.  The entire capability is referred to as L3AV, or the Logistics Living Lab Audio-Video 
capability.  Appendix E contains details of the L3AV architecture.   
 
3.3 Wireless Network Setup 
 Aside from encrypting the application layer data using SRTP, there exists multiple ways 
to secure the entire wireless local area network [37].  For the purposes of this study, well-
established procedures are followed by securing the network at the link layer.  The first step in 
securing a wireless network is to choose a strong SSID (Service Set Identifier).  For the purposes 
of this study, a combination of letters, numbers and symbols with a length of 8 characters is used.  
Also, the SSID broadcast feature is turned off to make it more difficult to detect the presence of 
the network.  A strong password with upper and lower case numbers, characters and numbers, 
and at least 12 characters in length is chosen for the administrator password to the wireless router.  
Additionally, a MAC (Medium Access Control) filter is used.  Proper settings for the MAC 
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 address is to allow by exception, therefore, the MAC addresses of all the network cards in use 
during the thesis experiment are allowed by exception to access the WLAN.   
Finally, all network cards are checked for the highest level of encryption technology.  
The highest level of common encryption technology is the WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) 
Personal encryption technology implemented in the link layer.  The advantages of WPA over 
WEP include the implementation of TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol).  TKIP allows the 
protection of the key by renegotiation of the key every 10,000 packets.  A strong password should 
be also be used for key generation within the WPA Personal encryption system.   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the design of the experiment and the method to set up laboratory 
software to address the research goals.   The two primary goals that are addressed in this chapter 
are: 1) Is there a significant effect on the quality of the audio and video data by routing the traffic 
through an AP compared with two arbitrary nodes on a WLAN transmitting and receiving audio 
and video traffic?; and 2) Is there a significant impact by securing the audio traffic on the 
perceived quality of the audio received?  Section 3.1 describes the experimental design based on 
the questions that are of interest to the capacity of secure wireless multimedia.  This section 
discusses a method to secure multimedia IP traffic when using Java applications.  Section 3.2 
describes the high level architecture of software that is used for collection of the human subject 
data.  Section 3.3 describes how the wireless network is secured against network layer 
compromises of security.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 This chapter discusses the results and analysis of the subject data as prescribed in Chapter 
3.  Section 4.1 discusses how the analysis proceeds throughout the entire chapter.  Section 4.2 
discusses the results and analysis of the audio MOS data.  Section 4.3 discusses the results of the 
video MOS data.  Section 4.4 discusses the results and analyzes the intelligibility data.  Section 
4.5 summarizes the results of this chapter.   
4.1 Analysis of Significance 
The raw data collected for this thesis effort can be found in Appendix C.  For the 
significance tests of the factors of interest, SPSS 14.0 for Windows Release 14.0.0 (5 Sept 2005), 
specifically, the repeated measures feature of the general linear model for MANOVA-type 
analysis was extensively used.  The reason for the widespread use of this technique is that the 
factor significance can be quickly found by inspecting the p value for all effects (single- and 
multiple-way) [9].  For details of this analysis technique, please refer to the SPSS documentation 
[46].  The analysis of the data starts with a general 2x2x2x2 factor analysis and proceeds to more 
precise data sets to answer the thesis questions in greater detail.  All SPSS analysis to determine 
factor significance can be found in Appendix D.   
The research goals will be accomplished through answering five questions:  
1) Does the data show significance in terms of number of conversations?  Demonstration 
of significant differences in audio MOS resulting from differences in the number of conversations 
is important to provide credibility to the collected data set.   
2) Is there a significant impact on the audio stream by presence of a video transmission?  
This question is similar to Qestion 1 in that if it is determined that the data shows a significant 
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 decrease in perceived audio quality when the video stream is added, then the data will have 
greater credibility.   
3) Does having one of the terminals connected to an AP by Ethernet have a significant 
effect as opposed to having only non-AP terminals on a WLAN?  If questions 1 and 2 are both 
answered in the positive, suggesting internal validity, a meaningful result may be determined.   
4) Does securing the audio stream significantly affect the MOS of either the audio or 
video streams?  This question is central to this thesis as the effect of securing RTP packets on a 
wireless network is not known.  
5) Does the video MOS data suggest similar effects by the variation in questions 1-4 
when compared with the audio MOS?  Similar to the audio MOS analysis, if the answer to 
questions 1 and 2 answered from the perspective of video MOS is positive, then the results of 
questions 3 and 4 have additional credibility.   
 For the purpose of expressing the significance of the factors varied in the experiment, the 
following notation is used: 
     ( )ypxF ba == ,),(                  (10) 
where F denotes that the significance is expressed in terms of the F-ratio, a is the degrees of 
freedom of the factor, b is the degrees of freedom of the error term, x is the calculated value of 
the F-ratio, p indicates that y is the decimal value indicating significance.  If the p-value is below 
.05, the effect is significant [9]. 
 
4.2 Audio MOS Analysis 
4.2.1 Analysis of All Audio MOS Data 
When considering the effect on the audio MOS with respect to the within-subjects factors 
of the number of conversations, use of the AP and use of video in addition to the between-
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 subjects factor of use of the secured audio RTP, it is determined that the number of  
conversations ( )001.,34.14)34,1( == pF  , use of the AP ( )001.,47.13)34,1( == pF  and use of video 
( )0005.,45.99)34,1( <= pF  are all significant.   However, the between-subject effect of securing 
the audio stream is found to be insignificant ( )076.,35.3)34,1( == pF .   
By looking at the two-way effects it is found that the number of conversations by the 
addition of video traffic has a significant effect on the audio MOS ( )006.,28.5)34,1( == pF .  This 
effect is graphed in Figure 35.  As an example of how to read Figure 35, consider the slope of the 
audio-only line labeled as “isVideoTraffic – false.”  Note that this slope is steeper compared to 
the combined audio-video stream as the two-way statistic suggested.  Thus, this figure illustrates 
that increasing the number of conversations has a greater negative impact on perceived quality of 
the audio-only stream (Audio MOS) when compared with the combined audio-video stream. 
Top level analysis of the audio MOS data suggests positive results to questions 1 and 2, 
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Figure 35.  2-Way Effect Between the Number of Conversation and Use of Video 
 which are that the number of conversations and use of video in conjunction with the audio stream 
has a significant effect on the audio MOS.  There exists a significant within-subject effect of the 
two variable number of conversations and the addition of video there also exists a two-way effect 
between these variables.  Question 3 addresses the impact of use of the AP, which was found to 
be significant, since the audio MOS increased when the multimedia traffic was routed through the 
AP ( )003.,49.10)34,1( == pF .  
There also exists a three-way effect between the number of conversations, the use of 
video, and securing the audio stream ( )013.,51.8)34,1( == pF .  To view this three-way effect, the 
two-way effects of number of conversations by use of video traffic is viewed separately when not 
securing the audio stream in Figure 36  and when securing the audio stream in Figure 37.  An 
immediate explanation of the existence of this three-way effect is not readily available so to 
understand the circumstance of this three way effect, the with- and without-AP data is analyzed.  
All other two-way and three-way effects are found to be insignificant as noted in the Appendix D.  
 
Figure 36.  2-way Effect Between the Number of Conversations and Use of Video (Unsecured) 
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Figure 37.  2-way Effect Between the Number of Conversations and Use of Video (Secured) 
 
4.2.2 Analysis of the With- and Without-AP Audio MOS Data 
The use of AP data set indicates similar results to the combined data set in terms of the 
three way effect of number of conversations by the use of video by securing the audio stream as 
this effect is still significant ( )007.,29.8)34,1( == pF .  Also, the AP data set is consistent in terms 
of the significance in terms of the factors of the number of conversations 
( )003.,00.10)34,1( == pF , presence of video traffic ( )0005.,65.41)34,1( <= pF  and the two-way 
effect of number of conversations by the addition of video traffic ( )007.,29.8)34,1( == pF .  
Consistent with previous analysis, the securing the audio stream variable does not have a 
significant between-subjects effect ( )117.,58.2)34,1( == pF .   
The non-AP data set indicates different results than the combined data and the with-AP 
data set in terms of the three-way effect as this effect is found to be insignificant 
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 ( )111.,67.2)34,1( == pF .  However, consistent with prior analysis the two-way effect of number 
of conversations by the use of video is still significant ( )01.,50.34)34,1( == pF  as is the number 
of conversations ( )002.,93.10)34,1( == pF , use of video ( )0005.,50.34)34,1( <= pF , and securing 
the audio stream is not significant ( )121.,53.2)34,1( == pF . 
The results observed in the non-AP data set contradicts the significance evidence found 
in the combined and AP-only data only in terms of the significance of the three-way effect of 
number of conversations by use of video by the variable of securing the audio stream.  In later 
analysis of one and two conversation data and the with- and without- video traffic data sets, there 
is a specific set of circumstances that may have resulted in this three-way effect, possibly 
indicating that the three-way effect observed in the overall data and AP-data may have been the 
result of an experimental design error.   
 
4.2.3 Analysis of the One Conversation Audio MOS Data 
The relationship of one conversation audio MOS with the within-subjects factor of use of 
the AP and use of video with the between-subjects factor of use of the secured audio is next 
studied.  A new effect was discovered in this analysis as the two-way effect of video traffic by 
securing the audio stream was found to be significant ( )040.,55.4)34,1( == pF  and is graphed in 
Figure 38.  This new effect is likely related to the three-way effect of number of conversations by 
use of video by securing the audio stream.  This effect is studied in greater detail by separating 
this data set into the constituent with- and without-AP components.  Also, as can be expected 
from the top-level and with- and without-AP data, the one conversation data indicated that both 
the use of AP ( )007.,77.7)34,1( == pF  and use of video ( )0005.,49.51)34,1( <= pF  is significant.  
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 Also, the securing the audio stream effect is not significant ( )347.,91.0)34,1( == pF .  The other 
two-way effects and the three-way effects were not significant as noted in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 38. 2-way Effect Between the Use of Video and Security During One Conversation 
 
Since the two-way effect of video traffic by securing the audio stream is found to have a 
significant effect on the audio MOS when one conversation is occurring, it makes sense to look at 
both conditions of use of the AP to see if the same effect is still present in both cases.  It must be 
stated that the one conversation data has consistent results in terms of the significant effect of the 
use of video, use of the AP and the absence of effect of the securing the audio stream.    
The use of AP data for one conversation is consistent with the combined one 
conversation data (with and without use of AP) in terms of the two-way effect of the use of video 
by securing the audio stream ( )040.,57.4)34,1( == pF  and is graphed in the Figure 39.  
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 Additionally, the factor of video traffic is significant ( )0005.,89.30)34,1( <= pF , whereas the 
securing the audio stream factor is not significant ( )456.,569.0)34,1( == pF .   
 
Figure 39.  2-way Effect between the Use of Video and Security (One Conversation with AP) 
 
In a similar manner, the effect on the Audio MOS is studied when the AP is not used and 
only one conversation is occurring.  In contrast to the combined and use of AP data, the two-way 
effect of use of video by the variable of securing the audio stream is not significant 
( )188.,81.1)34,1( == pF .  As expected, the video traffic is still significant 
( )0005.,17.45)34,1( <= pF  while securing the audio stream is not significant 
( )367.,836.)34,1( == pF .  
It is difficult to explain the two-way effect of larger than expected degradation of the 
audio MOS when the audio was secure and video was present which was only significant when 
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 the AP was being used.  A possible reason why the two-way effect is only present in the AP 
terminal is that because the terminal has two more processes running than the non-AP network, 
the additional processing time of encryption and decryption of the audio RTP packet is enough to 
significantly reduce the quality of the audio stream.  It is possible to test this explanation by 
running the multiple AP processes on multiple computers connected via Ethernet to the AP.   By 
also dividing the one conversation data into the with- and without-video data sets and the with- 
and without-AP data sets, any inconsistencies or other patterns of the three-way effect may be 
determined.    
All effects within the without-video one conversation set are consistent with the effects 
mentioned up to this point.  The audio MOS analysis for the one conversation without video 
indicated a significant difference based on the use of the AP ( )026.,43.5)34,1( == pF .  Both the 
two-way effect of use of AP by the factor of securing the audio stream ( )510.,443.0)34,1( == pF  
and the factor of securing the audio stream ( )701.,150.0)34,1( == pF  are insignificant.   
An unusual effect is first noted in the with-video one conversation data set which 
suggests that the securing the audio stream of the audio decreases the audio MOS.  Otherwise all 
effects previously mentioned held in this data set, specifically, there is not a significant effect by 
the two-way factor use of AP by securing the audio stream ( )421.,663.0)34,1( == pF , and the use 
of AP ( )050.,15.4)34,1( == pF  and securing the audio stream ( )020.,97.5)34,1( == pF  are 
significant.  
By now comparing the with- and without-video data of the one conversation data set it 
can be shown that securing the audio stream decreases the MOS only when the video is active, 
which is consistent with the analysis of the combined one-conversation data.  This effect can 
possibly be explained as the effect of additional processing time required on a computer for the 
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 encryption/decryption or in terms of increased network load or a combination of these two 
effects.   
 
4.2.4 Analysis of the Two Conversation Audio MOS Data 
Referring back to the number of conversations effect on the audio MOS, the data related 
to when two conversations were occurring is next considered.  As expected, the use of the AP 
( )003.,49.10)34,1( == pF  and use of video ( )0005.,72.28)34,1( <= pF  are both significant.  
However, all of the two-way and three-way effects were insignificant for the two conversation 
data as can be seen in Appendix D.  The analysis of the between-subject effect of securing the 
audio stream yielded a result which is significant ( )034.,90.4)34,1( <= pF .  
When analyzing the data where two conversations were both routed through the AP, both 
the use of video ( )0005.,346.16)34,1( <= pF  and securing the audio stream 
( )044.,387.4)34,1( == pF  are significant.  The two way factor of use of video by the factor of 
securing the audio stream is not significant ( )115.,62.2)34,1( == pF .   
In contrast to the combined and with AP data, the without AP two-conversation data do 
not show a significant effect by the variable of securing the audio stream 
( )096.,93.2)34,1( == pF .  However, the use of video is significant ( )017.,24.6)34,1( == pF , 
while the two-way effect of use of video by securing the audio stream is not significant 
( )411.,69.0)34,1( == pF .  
A possible explanation of the significant effect of securing the audio stream degrading 
the audio MOS when there are two conversations and only when there is use of the AP can be 
explained by the experimental setup that has one station simulating all network traffic originating 
from terminals connected directly to the AP by Ethernet.  When transmitting and receiving two 
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 encrypted audio streams, it is possible that the audio MOS degrades because of the greater 
amount of processing that is required to encrypt and decrypt the audio signal.  A follow-up study 
can determine if this is the cause of the effect by modifying the software to run multiple terminals 
simulating traffic routed through an AP. 
 
4.2.5 Analysis of Audio-Only Audio MOS Data 
Further explanation of the six primary effects seen in the top level analysis can be made 
by discussing the audio-only and with-video data separately.  Starting with the audio-only traffic, 
a data comparison is done between one conversation data with the within-subject variable of use 
of AP and the between-subject variable of securing the audio stream.  Two of the within-subject 
factors are significant: the number of conversations ( )0005.,93.20)34,1( <= pF  and use of the AP 
 
Figure 40.  2-way Effect Between the Number of Conversations and Security With Audio-Only 
 54
 ( )005.,01.9)34,1( == pF .  Additionally, there exists a two-way effect: the number of 
conversations by securing the audio stream ( )029.,23.5)34,1( == pF  which is graphed in Figure 
40.  However, the effect of securing the audio stream was insignificant in this part of the analysis 
( )278.,12.1)34,1( == pF .  Also, the two-way effect of securing the audio stream and use of the AP 
is not significant ( )000.1,00.0)34,1( == pF .  
When only audio data is considered with use of the AP, there exist a within-subject factor 
of number of conversations from one to four and the between-subject factor of securing the audio 
stream.  The number of conversations is significant ( )0005.,45.44)102,3( <= pF  whereas the 
securing the audio stream was not significant ( )058.,85.3)34,1( == pF .  The number of 
conversations by securing the audio stream two-way effect was not significant 
( )069.,44.2)102,3( == pF .   
Continuing the analysis of the audio data, only the non-AP data is considered in terms of 
the within-subject factor of number of conversations and the between subject factor of securing 
the audio stream.  Only the number of conversations factor is significant 
( )0005.,00.18)34,1( <= pF , since the securing the audio stream factor is not significant 
( )340.,94.9)34,1( == pF , along with the two-way effect of number of conversations by the factor 
of securing the audio stream ( )166.,00.2)34,1( == pF .  
It is possible that the insignificance of the two-way effect of number of conversations by 
securing the audio stream effect is caused by the security reducing the audio MOS more severely 
in the two conversation data set than is expected without encryption.  This would be caused by 
either greater demands on the computer for encryption and decryption and possibly by network 
congestion.   
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 4.2.6 Analysis of Video-Enabled Audio MOS Data 
The video MOS data analysis procedure is very similar to the analysis of the audio MOS 
data.  Analysis of the video MOS data suggests the number of conversations has an insignificant 
effect on the video MOS ( )356.,875.0)34,1( == pF .  Also, the use of the AP 
( )055.,95.3)35,1( == pF  is insignificant, in addition to all the two- and three-way effects (see 
Appendix D).  However, the between-subjects variable of securing the audio stream is 
significant ( )017.,26.6)34,1( == pF  . 
The insignificance of the number of conversations must be addressed because of the 
uniqueness of this lack of effect.  A possible explanation of the insignificance of this effect is that 
the network is already at capacity under the one conversation combined audio-video scenario.  
This is reasonable because the audio MOS 30.075.1 ±  is already at a very low value.   
Therefore, it would be expected that a significant effect of adding additional traffic to the network 
would not significantly decease the audio MOS.   
Additionally, the significance of the securing the audio stream factor stands in contrast to 
other results.  The data is suggesting that the additional processing time required for encrypting 
and decrypting the audio packets, coupled with sending and receiving of video, significantly 
decreases the audio MOS.  However, this effect does not hold when comparing with- and 
without- AP data.  This suggests that this effect is not significant, rather, it is related to whether 
the audio stream is routed through the AP. 
It should be noted that the use of the AP is nearly significant.  Since the test of 
significance of the between-subjects effect test nearly passed, it is of good practice to check the 
results of the with- and without-AP data for consistency with the combined data set.   
In order to further analyze the insignificance of the number of conversations under the 
combined video and audio network conditions, the use of AP data is examined separately while 
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 still considering the number of conversations factor.  Data including use of AP meeting the above 
criteria do not suggest a significant effect by either the number of conversations 
( )356.,88.0)34,1( == pF  or securing the audio stream ( )069.,54.3)34,1( == pF .  
Nearly identical results in terms of factor significance are obtained by considering only 
the non-AP data with video and audio traffic.  No significance was found for either the number of 
conversations ( )476.,52.0)34,1( == pF  or securing the audio stream ( )086.,13.3)34,1( == pF .   
Since the individual data (with and without the AP) that had audio and video on the 
network do not suggest a significant effect of the securing the audio stream, the validity of the 
significance found for securing the audio stream factor in the combined (with and without AP) 
results can be brought into question.  Also, the data analysis for the audio MOS with the 
combined audio and video on the secure wireless network suggests that the number of 
conversations is not significant consistently across all three data sets, which suggests that that the 
network is already at capacity under the one conversation combined audio-video scenario. 
Therefore, additional traffic can not significantly decrease the audio MOS any further.  This 
effect is the seventh consistent pattern in the data set. 
 
4.3 Analysis of Video MOS Data 
To help validate the audio MOS results in the combined audio and video data sets, the 
video data is next examined to determine if the number of conversations or the securing the audio 
stream of the audio stream has a significant effect on the video MOS.  In contrast to the audio 
data results when both audio and video was on the network, the video MOS results are 
significantly affected by the number of conversations ( )022.,76.5)34,1( == pF .  Additionally, 
securing the audio stream is a significant factor ( )008.,83.7)34,1( == pF .  It should also be noted 
 57
 that use of the AP is not a significant factor ( )172.,95.1)34,1( == pF , and there exist no significant 
two- or three-way effects (see Appendix D). 
To help explain why the number of conversations was significant for the video MOS 
when it is not significant for the audio MOS under the same network conditions, it is 
hypothesized that subjects have a higher tolerance for delays in video which caused the video 
MOS to have a high contrast in scores between one conversation and two.  Evidence to support 
this explanation includes a video MOS mean of 151.0972.1 ±  which is significantly higher than 
the audio MOS mean when video is also present on the network 141.0549.1 ± , both of these 
values are calculated with a 95% confidence interval.  The two mean values are the estimated 
marginal means that take into effect the number of conversations and whether the audio RTP is 
secured.   
Another unique pattern seen within this data set is the insignificance of the effect of the 
AP on the video MOS.  A possible way to reword this effect is that the efficiency of the stream 
originating from the AP makes a significant improvement to the audio traffic, and not the video 
traffic.  An explanation of why the video traffic is not significantly improved by presence of the 
AP is that video RTP packets are above a critical size in which a significant efficiency is gained 
through use of the AP.  
As noted in the audio MOS for the same data set, the securing the audio stream is a 
significant factor, which may help suggest that security processing delays are significantly 
impacting the video MOS.  To help understand this effect further, the with- and without-AP data 
is looked at separately, to see if the same pattern seen in the audio MOS data helps explain this 
unique effect.   
In order to further analyze the insignificance of the number of conversations under the 
combined video and audio network conditions, the AP use data will be looked at separately while 
still considering the number of conversations factor.  Data including use of AP meeting the above 
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 criteria also does not suggest a significant effect by the number of conversations 
( )086.,39.1)34,1( == pF .  However, the audio securing the audio stream does significantly affect 
the video MOS ( )012.,02.7)34,1( == pF .  
Opposite results in terms of factor significance are obtained when considering only the 
non-AP video MOS data.  The data suggests that the securing the audio stream is not significant 
( )075.,38.3)34,1( == pF , and the number of conversations is significant ( )023.,65.5)34,1( == pF .   
When analyzing just the one conversation data it is noted that both the use of AP 
( )524.,42.0)34,1( == pF  and securing the audio stream ( )126.,46.2)34,1( == pF  are both 
insignificant.   
When analyzing just the two conversation data, it is noted that the use of AP is not 
significant ( )132.,39.2)34,1( == pF , while the securing the audio stream is significant 
( )019.,10.6)34,1( == pF . 
Comparing all five of the video MOS data sets, two unique patterns are discovered that 
are not present in the audio MOS data.  If there are two conversations or there is use of the AP, 
then if the audio is secured, then the video MOS value decreases.  The use of AP with a secure 
audio channel can be expected to have a reduced video MOS score because a similar 
phenomenon is noticed with the audio MOS data since a combination of video and securing the 
audio stream did decrease audio MOS.  When two conversations coupled with securing the audio 
stream decreases the video MOS, this indicates that there exists either a processing or network 
delay which causes the decreased the video MOS.  Since the securing the audio stream processing 
was spread among the four terminals, the securing the audio stream must have caused a network 
delay only in the case of video MOS with two conversations.   
The second pattern in the video MOS data set is that the video MOS was not affected by 
an increase in conversations from one to two in the use of AP data set.  This pattern is likely 
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 caused by a more efficient use of network resources by the AP as opposed to multiple terminals 
on a WLAN.  This pattern can be thought of as similar to the used of the AP increasing the audio 
MOS as seen in prior analysis.   
 
4.4 Analysis of Intelligibility Data 
 For the purpose of increasing the validity of the MOS analysis and in the search for 
additional trends in secure wireless multimedia applications, data is collected on the number of 
correctly matched words transmitted with the audio stream.  Based on the design of the 
experiment, two effects are tested in this part of the study; the effect of securing the voice real-
time data as well as the effect of adding a video transmission simultaneous to the audio 
transmission.  In contrast to the MOS data set, all the data sets for the intelligibility study have 
only one conversation occurring.  The raw data collected consisted of the number correct in both 
the audio treatment and video treatment.   
 The data collected suggests that the effect of the video are significant 
( )012.,07.7)34,1( == pF .  However, both the effect of securing the audio stream 
( )737.,69.0)34,1( == pF  and the two-way effect of use of video by securing the audio stream 
( )409.,07.7)34,1( == pF  are insignificant.   
 These results are consistent with the MOS data results in terms of the lack of an effect by 
securing the audio stream as well as the presence of a significant effect by the use of video.  The 
audio-only MOS value is  whereas the with-video audio MOS is .  Even 
with this relatively low value of the with-video audio MOS, the number of correctly matched 
words is .  This corresponds with a mean percent correct greater than 90% of the 
words spoken over the connection.  In comparison, study of the G.723.1, G.728 and G.729 
codecs, low packet loss percentages peak in the high 80% category [19].   
36.083.2 ± 30.075.1 ±
54.01.18 ±
 60
  
4.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter discusses the results and analysis of the subject data as prescribed in Chapter 
3.  Section 4.1 discusses how the analysis proceeded throughout the entire chapter.  Section 4.2 
discusses the results and analysis of the audio MOS data.  Section 4.3 discusses the results of the 
video MOS data.  Section 4.4 discusses the results and analyzes the intelligibility data.  
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V. Conclusion 
 This chapter concludes the thesis.  Section 5.1 summarizes the analysis completed in 
Chapter 4.  Section 5.2 discusses recommendations for future research based on the results of this 
thesis.  Section 5.3 discusses the relevance of this research effort.   
5.1 Summary of Analysis 
 A comprehensive survey of the questions and answers that are addressed in this study in 
addition to the primary effects observed in the results and analysis chapter is required because of 
the dispersal of the information within Chapter 4.   To assist the reader, exceptions to the answers 
given in 5.1.1 are addressed in the secondary data effects subsection (5.1.2).  Also, speculation 
regarding the technical reasons for these effects and answers is not addressed in this chapter as 
this information is contained within Chapter 4.   
 5.1.1 Study Questions and Answers 
 The first research goal regards the impact of the number of conversations on the audio 
MOS.  The answer to this question is that as the number of conversations increase from one to 
two, there is a decrease in the audio MOS by 23.5%.  When the number of conversations 
increases from two to three, the audio MOS decreases by 36.6%.  When the number of 
conversations increases from three to four, the audio MOS decrease by 9.8%.     
 The second research goal regards the impact of adding video capability to an audio 
conversation.  It is observed that the addition of video decreases the audio MOS by 38.9%. 
 The third research goal regards the impact of the AP upon the audio MOS.  The answer to 
this question is that when the AP forwards the audio traffic, the audio MOS increases by 18.4%. 
 The fourth research goal regards the effect of implementing a secure transmission of 
audio traffic upon the audio MOS.  The answer to this question is that implementing secure audio 
has no significant effect on the audio MOS. 
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  Next, these questions are addressed from the point of view of the video data.  Note that 
question two is not applicable. 
 When considering question one which regards the impact of the number of conversations 
on the video MOS, it is determined that an increase in the number of conversation decreases the 
video MOS by 16.8%. 
 When considering question three which regards the impact of routing the traffic through 
an AP, it is determined (in contradiction to the audio data) that there is no significant effect on the 
video MOS. 
 When considering question four which regards the impact of securing the audio stream, it 
is determined that there is no significant effect on the video MOS.   
  
5.1.2 Secondary Data Effects 
 With respect to audio MOS, increasing the number of conversations decreases an audio-
only signal by 8.5% more than a combined voice and video signal.  Also, with respect to audio 
MOS, in cases of two conversations with video, the use of a secured audio signal decreases the 
audio MOS by 12.3%.  The final secondary data effect that is observed relative to audio MOS is 
that implementing secure audio decreases the audio MOS by an additional 12% when combined 
with the effect of increasing the number of conversations from one to two. 
 With respect to video MOS, if there are two conversations and the audio is secured, then 
the video MOS value will decrease by 23.3%  If an AP is used to forward traffic then if the audio 
is secured, then the video MOS value decreases by 19.5%.  Also, the video MOS was not 
significantly affected by an increase in conversations from one to two when the AP was being 
used to forward the multimedia signal.   
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 5.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
A full implementation of the SRTP protocol was not achieved as part of this thesis.  
However, many of the technical aspects of achieving the full SRTP status are documented in this 
thesis.  Follow-up work can implement the remaining features of SRTP to include use of the AES 
instead of RSA, a method to securely transmit keys as detailed in the literature review as well as a 
block cipher mode of operation.   
Additional details are needed in terms of the discrepancy between the analytical and 
computer-based models of wireless audio-video and the empirical results obtained within this 
study.  Specifically in terms of analytical models, determining the answer to the question of 
whether it is it possible to use a model based on a node’s contribution to total network capacity to 
adequately describe the capacity of a wireless audio-video network is a useful question.  In 
relationship to computer models, a recommendation of a series of changes to OPNET’s wireless 
mode for the purpose of accurately predicting multimedia capacity of real networks would be 
very useful.   
Of lesser importance, but still left unanswered in this thesis is if using one laptop to 
simulate all foreign WLAN traffic causes a confounding effect when trying to determine the 
effect of the AP as was noted in Chapter 4.   
 
5.3 Relevance of the Current Investigation 
 The use of voice and video-services that rely on IP-networks is becoming more common 
based on the widespread use of broadband connections that can support such traffic.  
Additionally, the rapid improvements seen within the WLAN hardware development community 
are making transmission of multimedia services more available to the wireless device user.  When 
considering the next-generation 802.11n devices capable of transmission rates exceeding 
100Mbps, it now becomes more likely that relatively high numbers of mobile devices can be 
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 supported by wireless routers that are inexpensive enough for widespread deployment. 
Additionally, some mobile phones and devices can now support either cellular or IP-based 
technology.  This thesis illustrates the limitations of the existing technology 802.11g technology, 
yet demonstrates that secure voice communications are available to a great number of Java 
application developers.  Additionally, evidence within this thesis suggests that the suggested 
method of implementing secure voice transmission does not significantly affect the quality of the 
audio connection.   
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis.  Section 5.1 summarizes the analysis completed in 
Chapter 4.  Section 5.2 discusses recommendations for future research based on the results of this 
thesis.  Section 5.3 discusses the relevance of this research effort.   
 
 65
Appendix A.  Informed Consent Letter 
 
Informed Consent Letter 
For Research on 
Secure Wireless Multimedia 
 
 You are invited to participate in a research study on secure wireless multimedia.  This research is 
to be conducted by Lt Jason Seyba, USAF.  This research is in partial fulfillment of a Master’s degree 
program at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).  The objective of this study is to determine ways 
to improve secure voice and video communication links over wireless LAN connections.  
You will hear a series of voice messages over a communication network, in which you will 
evaluate your impression of the quality of the communication link by answering the following question 
about each stream: 
 
 Estimated Media Quality: 
 5. Excellent 
 4. Good 
 3. Fair 
 2. Poor 
 1. Bad 
 
 Additionally, you will be asked to match a spoken word with one of several choices that rhyme 
with the spoken word. Your individual answers will remain anonymous as you are not asked to, and should 
not; provide your name on the answer sheet.  In addition, the data will not be grouped by organization.  
Therefore organizational answers are also kept anonymous. 
 
 Your participation is COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY.  However, your input is important to 
improving analytical models for wireless secure multimedia capacities.  You may withdraw from this study 
at any time without penalty, and your survey data will not be used in the research.  Your decision to 
participate or withdraw will not jeopardize your relationship with your organization, the Air Force Institute 
of Technology, the Air Force, or the Department of Defense.   
 
PRIVACY ISSUES:  Records of my participation in this study may only be disclosed according to federal 
law, including the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and its implementing regulations (See Below). 
 
 
 
 
 
If you have any questions about this request, please contact Lt Jason R Seyba - Phone (937) 656-4558; E-
mail – jason.seyba@wpafb.af.mil 
 
HAVING READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED, YOU MUST DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY.  YOUR SIGNATURE INDICATES YOUR 
WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE. 
 
 
 
 
____________________________   ____________________________ 
Participant’s Signature Date   Investigator’s Signature Date 
66 
 
 
 
 
  
Privacy Act Statement  
  
Authority:  We are requesting disclosure of personal information, to include your Social Security Number. 
Researchers are authorized to collect personal information (including social security numbers) on research 
subjects under The Privacy Act-5 USC 552a, 10 USC 55, 10 USC 8013, 32 CFR 219, 45 CFR Part 46, and 
EO 9397, November 1943 (SSN). 
Purpose:  It is possible that latent risks or injuries inherent in this experiment will not be discovered until 
some time in the future.  The purpose of collecting this information is to aid researchers in locating you at a 
future date if further disclosures are appropriate. 
Routine Uses: Information (including name and SSN) may be furnished to Federal, State and local 
agencies for any uses published by the Air Force in the Federal Register, 52 FR 16431, to include, 
furtherance of the research involved with this study and to provide medical care. 
Disclosure:  Disclosure of the requested information is voluntary.   No adverse action whatsoever will be 
taken against you, and no privilege will be denied you based on the fact you do not disclose this 
information.  However, your participation in this study may be impacted by a refusal to provide this 
information. 
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Appendix B.  Subject Information Sheet 
 
Information Sheet 
For Research on 
Secure Wireless Multimedia 
 
 You are invited to participate in a research study on secure wireless multimedia.  This research is 
to be conducted by Lt Jason Seyba, USAF.  This research is in partial fulfillment of a Master’s degree 
program at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).  The objective of this study is to determine ways 
to improve secure voice and video communication links over wireless LAN connections. 
You will hear a series of voice messages over a communication network, in which you will 
evaluate your impression of the quality of the communication link by answering the following question 
about each stream: 
 
 Estimated Media Quality: 
 5. Excellent 
 4. Good 
 3. Fair 
 2. Poor 
 1. Bad 
 
 Additionally, you will be asked to match a spoken word with one of several choices that rhyme 
with the spoken word. Your individual answers will remain anonymous as you are not asked to provide 
your name to the software.  In addition, the data will not be grouped by organization.  Therefore 
organizational answers are also kept anonymous. 
 
 Your participation is COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY.  However, your input is important to 
improving analytical models for wireless secure multimedia capacities.  You may withdraw from this study 
at any time without penalty, and your survey data will not be used in the research.  Your decision to 
participate or withdraw will not jeopardize your relationship with your organization, the Air Force Institute 
of Technology, the Air Force, or the Department of Defense.   
 
PRIVACY ISSUES:  Records of my participation in this study may only be disclosed according to federal 
law, including the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and its implementing regulations (See Below). 
 
If you have any questions about this request, please contact Lt Jason R Seyba - Phone (937) 656-4558; E-
mail – jason.seyba@wpafb.af.mil 
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Privacy Act Statement  
  
Authority:  We are requesting disclosure of personal information, to include your Social Security Number. 
Researchers are authorized to collect personal information (including social security numbers) on research 
subjects under The Privacy Act-5 USC 552a, 10 USC 55, 10 USC 8013, 32 CFR 219, 45 CFR Part 46, and 
EO 9397, November 1943 (SSN). 
Purpose:  It is possible that latent risks or injuries inherent in this experiment will not be discovered until 
some time in the future.  The purpose of collecting this information is to aid researchers in locating you at a 
future date if further disclosures are appropriate. 
Routine Uses: Information (including name and SSN) may be furnished to Federal, State and local 
agencies for any uses published by the Air Force in the Federal Register, 52 FR 16431, to include, 
furtherance of the research involved with this study and to provide medical care. 
Disclosure:  Disclosure of the requested information is voluntary.   No adverse action whatsoever will be 
taken against you, and no privilege will be denied you based on the fact you do not disclose this 
information.  However, your participation in this study may be impacted by a refusal to provide this 
information. 
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Appendix C.  Secure Wireless Multimedia Raw Data 
 
 
All of the tables in Appendix C provide the raw MOS scores related to the perceived 
quality of the audio or video stream.  The subject numbers are listed in the first column for all 
tables.  For the Audio-Only Raw MOS Data, the perceived quality of the audio stream in each of 
the six network conditions is available in the second through seventh column.  As an example of 
how to read the Audio-Only Raw MOS Data, subject four rated network condition one 4/5 (Very 
Good).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audio-Only Raw MOS Data 
Subject # Network Condition 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 1 2 2 1 
2 2 2 2 1 3 2 
3 4 2 1 1 3 2 
4 4 2 1 1 3 2 
5 3 3 2 1 4 2 
6 1 1 1 2 1 2 
7 2 1 1 1 1 1 
8 2 1 1 1 2 2 
9 4 2 1 1 3 1 
10 2 4 2 1 2 2 
11 3 2 1 1 2 1 
12 4 2 1 1 3 1 
13 1 2 3 2 3 4 
14 4 3 2 1 3 2 
15 4 2 1 1 3 2 
16 5 2 1 1 3 2 
17 3 3 3 1 3 2 
18 2 3 1 1 1 1 
19 4 2 1 1 3 2 
20 2 1 1 1 3 1 
21 3 3 1 1 2 4 
22 3 3 1 1 2 2 
23 2 1 1 1 1 1 
24 2 2 1 1 3 2 
25 3 2 1 1 1 1 
26 4 2 1 2 4 3 
27 3 3 1 1 4 2 
28 2 2 1 1 2 2 
29 4 2 1 1 2 1 
30 3 1 1 1 3 1 
31 4 2 1 1 2 1 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 
33 4 4 1 1 3 3 
34 1 2 1 1 2 2 
35 3 2 2 1 3 1 
36 2 3 1 2 2 2 
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For the video-enabled audio and video raw MOS data, the perceived quality of the six 
network conditions is available in the second through seventh column.  As an example of how to 
read the Video-Enabled Audio and Video Raw MOS Data, subject thirteen rated the first network 
condition’s perceived audio quality 2/5 (Poor), whereas the perceived video quality is 3/5 (Fair). 
 
 
 
Video-Enabled Audio and Video Raw MOS Data 
Subject # Network Condition (Audio/Video) 
 1 (A) 1 (V) 2 (A) 2 (V) 5 (A) 5 (V) 6 (A) 6 (V) 
1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 
2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
3 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 
4 1 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 
5 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 2 
6 1 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 
7 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
8 2 3 2 2 2 3 1 1 
9 1 3 2 3 1 2 1 1 
10 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 
11 3 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 
12 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 
13 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 
14 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 
15 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
16 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 
17 3 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 
18 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 
19 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 
20 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
21 3 2 3 3 1 4 1 2 
22 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 
23 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
24 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 3 
25 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
26 4 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 
27 2 3 3 3 1 2 1 1 
28 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 
29 2 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 
30 1 2 1 2 2 4 3 4 
31 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
32 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
33 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 
34 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 
35 1 3 1 2 1 3 1 2 
36 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
 For the voice intelligibility data, the second column labeled “Audio” indicates the 
number of words that were selected correctly from a list of words that rhymed with the word that 
is spoken over an audio-only stream.  The third column entitled “Video” indicates the number of 
words that were selected correctly when there existed both an audio and video stream.   
 
Voice Intelligibility Raw Number Correct (Out of 20) Data  
  
 Subject # Audio Video 
 1 20 18 
 2 18 19  
3 18 17  
4 20 20  
5 19 18  
 6 17 19 
 7 20 17 
 8 20 14 
 9 20 16  
10 16 20  
11 19 18  
 12 19 16 
 13 19 17 
 14 19 19 
 15 18 20  
16 20 20  
17 20 18  
18 20 20  
 19 18 20 
 20 19 19 
 21 19 18 
 22 19 19  
23 19 16  
24 20 18  
 25 20 15 
 26 19 19 
 27 18 20 
 28 20 17  
29 20 18  
30 18 19  
31 18 18  
 32 20 15 
\ 33 19 18 
 34 19 19 
 35 19 19  
36 20 18 
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Appendix D.  Additional Subject Data Analysis 
 
 
Analysis of All Audio MOS Data 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: audioMOS  
numberOfConversations isAPUsed isVideoTraffic 
Dependent 
Variable 
FALSE A5 1 FALSE 
TRUE V5A 
FALSE A1 TRUE 
TRUE V1A 
FALSE A6 2 FALSE 
TRUE V6A 
FALSE A2 TRUE 
TRUE V2A 
       
Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value Label N 
0 FALSE 18 isSecure 
1 TRUE 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Transformed Variable: Average  
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
 
 
 
Source df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Intercept 1,069.531 1 1,069.531 613.668 0.000 
isSecure 5.837 1 5.837 3.349 0.076 
Error 59.257 34 1.743   
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Video-Enabled Audio MOS Raw Data 
 
were extracted from the article “Distribution and Repair In Variable Environments (DRIVE) Model Logic” 
by Richard Moore and Bob McCormick (McCormick and Moore, 1992). 
Section 1 - The DRIVE System 
 The Weapon System Management Information System (WSMIS) is a decision support system that 
assesses logistics support, focusing on weapon system availability.  DRIVE makes up two modules within 
WSMIS; D087J (Classified DRIVE) and D087K (Unclassified DRIVE).  DRIVE extends the WSMIS 
approach of logistics capacity assessment to the Air Logistics Center (ALC) level by defining repair and 
distribution priorities, based on elements such as aircraft availability goals, planned flying hours, and 
worldwide asset position (see Figure 2 below). 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Mean 
Square Source df F Sig. 
numberOfConversations 11.281 1 11.281 14.335 0.001
numberOfConversations * isSecure 
0.587 1 0.587 0.746 0.394
Error(numberOfConversations) 
26.757 34 0.787     
isAPUsed 7.670 1 7.670 13.465 0.001
isAPUsed * isSecure 0.087 1 0.087 0.152 0.699
Error(isAPUsed) 19.368 34 0.570     
isVideoTraffic 41.253 1 41.253 99.545 0.000
isVideoTraffic * isSecure 0.281 1 0.281 0.679 0.416
Error(isVideoTraffic) 14.090 34 0.414     
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed 
0.003 1 0.003 0.012 0.914
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed * isSecure 
0.087 1 0.087 0.294 0.591
Error(numberOfConversations*isAPUsed) 
10.035 34 0.295     
numberOfConversations * isVideoTraffic 
5.281 1 5.281 8.514 0.006
numberOfConversations * isVideoTraffic * isSecure 
4.253 1 4.253 6.857 0.013
Error(numberOfConversations*isVideoTraffic) 
21.090 34 0.620     
isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic 0.281 1 0.281 0.420 0.521
isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic * isSecure 
0.087 1 0.087 0.130 0.721
Error(isAPUsed*isVideoTraffic) 
22.757 34 0.669     
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic 
0.003 1 0.003 0.018 0.895
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic * 
isSecure 0.420 1 0.420 2.132 0.153
Error(numberOfConversations*isAPUsed*isVideoTraffic)
6.701 34 0.197     
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Analysis of One Conversation Audio MOS Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: audioMOS 
isAPUsed isVideoTraffic 
Dependent 
Variable 
FALSE A5 FALSE 
TRUE V5A 
FALSE A1 TRUE 
TRUE V1A 
 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
0 FALSE 18 isSecure 
1 TRUE 18 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Source df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
isAPUsed 4.000 1 4.000 7.771 0.009
isAPUsed * isSecure 0.000 1 0.000 0.000 1.000
Error(isAPUsed) 17.500 34 0.515   
isVideoTraffic 38.028 1 38.028 51.489 0.000
isVideoTraffic * isSecure 3.361 1 3.361 4.551 0.040
Error(isVideoTraffic) 25.111 34 0.739   
isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic 0.111 1 0.111 0.345 0.561
isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic * isSecure 0.444 1 0.444 1.381 0.248
Error(isAPUsed*isVideoTraffic) 10.944 34 0.322   
      
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Source df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Intercept 650.250 1 650.250 434.447 0.000
isSecure 1.361 1 1.361 0.909 0.347
Error 50.889 34 1.497   
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Analysis of Two Conversation Audio MOS Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: audioMOS  
isAPUsed isVideoTraffic 
Dependent 
Variable 
FALSE A6 FALSE 
TRUE V6A 
FALSE A2 TRUE 
TRUE V2A 
 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value Label N 
0 FALSE 18 isSecure 
1 TRUE 18 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square Source df F Sig. 
isAPUsed 3.674 1 3.674 10.494 0.003
isAPUsed * isSecure 0.174 1 0.174 0.496 0.486
Error(isAPUsed) 11.903 34 0.350     
isVideoTraffic 8.507 1 8.507 28.724 0.000
isVideoTraffic * isSecure 1.174 1 1.174 3.963 0.055
Error(isVideoTraffic) 10.069 34 0.296     
isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic 0.174 1 0.174 0.319 0.576
isAPUsed * isVideoTraffic * isSecure 0.063 1 0.063 0.115 0.737
Error(isAPUsed*isVideoTraffic) 18.514 34 0.545     
            
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Transformed Variable: Average  
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square Source df F Sig. 
Intercept 430.563 1 430.563 416.772 0.000
isSecure 5.063 1 5.063 4.900 0.034
Error 35.125 34 1.033     
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Analysis of Video-Enabled Audio MOS Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: audioMOS  
numberOfConversations isAPUsed 
Dependent 
Variable 
FALSE V5A 1 
TRUE V1A 
FALSE V6A 2 
TRUE V2A 
      
Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value Label N 
FALSE 18isSecure 
TRUE 18
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Mean 
Square Source Type III Sum of Squares df F Sig. 
numberOfConversations 0.563 1 0.563 0.875 0.356
numberOfConversations * isSecure 0.840 1 0.840 1.308 0.261
Error(numberOfConversations) 21.847 34 0.643     
isAPUsed 2.507 1 2.507 3.952 0.055
isAPUsed * isSecure 0.174 1 0.174 0.274 0.604
Error(isAPUsed) 21.569 34 0.634     
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed 0.007 1 0.007 0.038 0.846
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed * isSecure 0.063 1 0.063 0.344 0.562
Error(numberOfConversations*isAPUsed) 6.181 34 0.182     
            
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Transformed Variable: Average  
Mean 
Square Source Type III Sum of Squares df F Sig. 
Intercept 345.340 1 345.340 498.169 0.000
isSecure 4.340 1 4.340 6.261 0.017
Error 23.569 34 0.693     
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 Analysis of Video MOS Data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: audioMOS  
numberOfConversations isAPUsed 
Dependent 
Variable 
FALSE V5V FALSE 
TRUE V1V 
FALSE V6V TRUE 
TRUE V2V 
      
Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value Label N 
false 18 isSecure 
true 18 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Mean 
Square Source df F Sig. 
numberOfConversations 4.694 1 4.694 5.763 0.022
numberOfConversations * isSecure 0.111 1 0.111 0.136 0.714
Error(numberOfConversations) 27.694 34 0.815     
isAPUsed 1.000 1 1.000 1.946 0.172
isAPUsed * isSecure 0.028 1 0.028 0.054 0.818
Error(isAPUsed) 17.472 34 0.514     
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed 0.250 1 0.250 0.965 0.333
numberOfConversations * isAPUsed * isSecure 0.444 1 0.444 1.716 0.199
Error(numberOfConversations*isAPUsed) 8.806 34 0.259     
            
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Transformed Variable: Average  
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Mean 
Square Source df F Sig. 
Intercept 560.111 1 560.111 701.715 0.000
isSecure 6.250 1 6.250 7.830 0.008
Error 27.139 34 0.798     
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Analysis of Intelligibility Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: audioMOS  
Dependent 
Variable isVideoUsed 
FALSE audioCorrect 
TRUE videoCorrect 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
  Value Label N 
 
 
 
FALSE 18 isSecure 
TRUE 18 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Mean 
Square Source df F Sig. 
isVideoUsed 17.014 1 17.014 7.071 0.012
isVideoUsed * isSecure 1.681 1 1.681 0.698 0.409
Error(isVideoUsed) 81.806 34 2.406     
            
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: audioMOS  
Transformed Variable: Average  
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Mean 
Square Source df F Sig. 
Intercept 24,827.347 1 24,827.347 22,797.204 0.000
isSecure 0.125 1 0.125 0.115 0.737
Error 37.028 34 1.089     
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Appendix E. Software Architecture 
 This appendix discusses the architecture of the software that is used for the collection of 
data.  Section E1 discusses the top layer of the software used for controlling the type and duration 
of the audio and video streams sent in the lower layer.  Section E2 discusses the overall 
architecture of the lower layer used for sending and receiving secure audio and video traffic.  
Section E4 discusses the architecture of the transmission object and Section E5 discusses the 
receiving object architecture.  Section E6 discusses how the connector object is secured.  Section 
E7 describes the sequence of sending and receiving the secure object using the components 
described earlier in the appendix.  Section E7 describes the method by which the traffic is 
encrypted and decrypted.  Section E8 summarizes this appendix.   
 
E1. RTP Traffic Control Layer 
 One of the most critical requirements of the RTP traffic control layers is to be able to turn 
on and off audio transmissions based on user inputs to a graphical interface provided in the 
software.  This is because the subjects indicate to the UI when the next audio/video clip should 
play and when the next matching word should be sent over the connection. 
 Two possibilities exist for controlling the RTP traffic, one is the use of well-developed 
open source server software; the Asterisk server was designed for such applications.  However, 
several problems exist with integrating the Asterisk server software with a custom Java 
application hosted on a Windows LAN, specifically, Asterisk requires a Linux OS.  Initial setup 
of the server was completed with difficulty, yet several additional complexities arose.  To use the 
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 Asterisk server for the experiment it is necessary to write the client side in compliance with SIP; 
this is a difficult and time-consuming task.   
 For this reason, the Asterisk-type capability is built from source.  The first barrier 
encountered is the necessity to build a two-way connection over a single port so that the software 
could communicate simple messages to or from the server.  All of the experiment software arose 
from FTP-type functionality that was originally developed from the Introduction to Computer 
Networks (CSCE 560) course taught at AFIT by Dr. Barry E. Mullins.  This initial technology 
barrier is solved by building separate classes that extended the Java class thread named 
ReadThread and ServerReadThread for the client and server respectively.  When both of the 
ReadThread classes are run, the method read is constantly called.  Inside of the read method a 
BufferedReader object is used to receive a String.  On the sending side a thread object is not 
required; instead a DataOutputStream object’s writeBytes method is used to transmit the desired 
String object.  
For the higher level capability, a UML diagram shown in Figure E1 is created for 
understanding the relationship between the classes Avatar, AVServer, Collaborator and Team.  
The Avatar class is designed to retain information specific to a client.  Attributes include the 
InetAddress, ID, name, the Boolean objects isInSpeakSession and isBroadcasting, a Team object 
and the controller class AVClientController.  Additionally, objects related to the static and 
dynamic transmission of audio and video traffic have pointers in this class and are called: 
MOS Quality Impairment R-Value 
4.5 Excellent Imperceptible 90 
4.0 Very Good Perceptible, but not annoying 80 
3.5 Good Very slightly annoying 70 
3.0 Fair Slightly annoying 60 
2.5 Poor Annoying 50 
1.0 Bad Very annoying 0 
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 soundTransmitter, videoTransmitter, staticAudioTransmitter and staticVideoTransmitter.  All 
four of these objects descend from a class named AVTransmit which is discussed in Section E2.  
The purpose of each of these AVTransmit objects is to transmit real-time information to the team.  
The AVServer Class holds such values as the objects serverInetAddress, and the integer 
serverPort as well as the controlling class AVClientController. All of the client application 
instances have an AVServer object that holds this information so that it can be used in the RTP 
Traffic Control Layer.  The Team class has the attribute of an Avatar object representing the 
client instance, an integer for recording the current session the team is engaged in, as well as a 
series of HashMaps linking collaborator attributes to specific Collaborator objects associated with 
the team.  A Collaborator object represents a user at a different terminal that can be referred to by 
name, port or id.  Additional attributes of the Collaborator object include the Boolean objects of 
whether the Collaborator isInSpeakSession and two receivers of the class AVReceive are referred 
to as soundReceiver and videoReceiver.  The AVReceive capability is described in Section E2.  
Also, it is logical to place UI component videoJPanel object of class JPanel in this layer, which is 
used by the videoReceiver object to display the real-time video on the user interface.    
Following the development of the two-way connection over a single port solution and the 
model for the information that is transferred, a protocol simple, yet powerful enough to meet the 
requirements of the software could be designed.  Since clients must be able to contact a server 
when starting the application, it is necessary for the client to have the server address and port set 
properly within the AVServer class.  The clients also have the attributes of the Avatar set on 
application start.  Thus, the information within both the AVServer and Avatar can be used to 
login to the system.   
All of the basic steps for logging in from both the client and server side are shown in 
Figure E2.  During the ClientController initialization procedure, the login method is called from 
within the ClientSignaller class.  As an example of the contents of the login signal string, the 
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 String object is: “login subjectA 134.120.71.129”.  After the ClientSignaller sends this String 
using the sendSignal method, the ServerSignaller receives the signal and uses the already created 
Team object to create a collaborator with the attributes sent.  Following this procedure, additional 
steps to include sending the id assigned back to the client and updating all other clients on the 
addition of a collaborator are completed.   
The procedure to start a VoIP session is shown in Figure E3.  After the 
AVClientController has been notified to start the session, most likely by a method call from 
within a visual component, the ClientSignaller is used to attempt the start of the session.  After 
the ServerSignaller receives the request to start the session, the attemptStartAudio message is sent 
to the AVServerController to determine if either the sender or receiver is currently in a session 
that would eliminate the possibility of adding this new session.  Assuming that no conflicts occur, 
the ServerSignaller is used by the AVServer Controller to confirm the start of the session.  This 
signal is sent to both the sender of the request and the ClientSignaller of the intended receiver 
(marked as 2nd in the below diagram).  Both the sender and the receiver ClientSignallers are 
called the attemptStartAudio method with the parameter of the Collaborator to start the session 
with.  At this point the AVReceive object’s startAudio method is called the parameter of the 
Collaborator to start the session with.  At this point the AVReceive object’s startAudio method is 
called. 
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 E2. Secure RTP Traffic Layer 
 There exist many methods to implement the capability of SRTP as described in Chapter 2 
of this thesis.  Publicly released code developed in C is widely available.  However, since the 
sponsor’s requirement of integrating the capability with a Java application was still needed, the 
only way to make use of the C would be to use the Java Native Interface library. This would 
allow the use of C source files, specifically the libSRTP software developed by Cisco Systems.  
However, even if the integration of the audio capability is successful, it cannot be assumed that 
the video content can be integrated within the Java  
application.   
Another possibility is to alter the source code within the JMF (Java Media Framework) 
library.  It is also possible to rewrite significant portions of the RTPSocket to allow for the 
encryption and decryption of packets.  Additionally, there exist a well developed set of security 
libraries in the form of the Java Secure Socket Extensions to encrypt and decrypt the video or 
audio packet data.  This solution, while complicated, still offered the best option from the point of 
view of development time.   
 
E3. Secure AVTransmit Capability  
As part of the construction of the top-level AVTransmit object, three parameters must be 
passed; the creating object in addition to two other Boolean variables.  The first of the Boolean 
objects is whether the object is used for audio transmissions; the second is whether this is a secure 
transmission.  Upon initialization of this object, another internal class that has the full capability 
of the original Sun implementation of AVTransmit, in addition to the added security features is 
constructed.  This original constructor method is passed the parameters of MediaLocator, 
InetAddress, Integer (for port to be used), Format, and the AVTransmitter.  In actual 
implementation of this system, the MediaLocator is set to either the “javasound://8000” for the 
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 default sound input or “vfw://0” for the default video input.  If a static audio or video file is to be 
transmitted, the file location is used in the MediaLocator constructor instead.  The localhost 
address is used for the second parameter.  An integer port base must be set by the AVConstructor 
prior to this initialization step, and is used as the third parameter.  The format is set to null to 
indicate the default should be used.   
Since the top-level AVTransmit object extends Thread, the start method is used to begin 
the transmission.  Figure E4 illustrates the sequence to construct the AVTransmit object.  Within 
this method the startTx method is called within the internal AVTransmit class.  Two methods are 
called within the startTx method; createProcessor and createTransmitter.  The createProcessor 
method creates and initializes the objects that supply the raw RTP data to the transmission object.  
The RTPManager object is created within the createTransmitter method.  A major difference of 
the L3AV code compared with the default AVTransmit2 and AVReceive2 code is that a class that 
implements the RTPConnector interface is used for the initialization of the RTPManager.  Before 
the AVSecureRTPSocket is initialized, the correct track of the DataSource is determined in 
addition to the correct port base, which is selected based on among other variables the current 
session of the team.   
 
Figure E4.  Sequence Diagram of AVTransmit Construction 
Among the parameters of concern for the construction of the AVSecureRTPSocket are 
the address, port, the AVClientController, confirmation that this is a transmitting socket, the 
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 AVSecureRTPSocket and a Boolean object that determines if secure features are being used.  It 
should be stated that AVSecureRTPSocket is implementing the RTPSocket interface which 
consists of eleven methods.  The entire capability of the AVSecureRTPSocket is explained in 
Section E6 because the receiving and transmitting capability must be explained simultaneously. 
 
E4. Secure AVReceive Capability 
 For construction of the AVTransmit object, two parameters must be passed; a 
Collaborator object and a Boolean object to describe if the session is secure.  Figure E5 illustrates 
the sequence to construct the AVReceive object.  Upon initialization of the AVReceive object, an 
inner AVReceive class which is based largely on the SDN (Sun Developers’ Network) 
AVReceive2 class.  For this internal construction, the AVReceive object requires the parameters 
of a string for the collaborator’s IP address, the integer values of the ports for audio and video, as 
well as a pointer to the JPanel used for displaying the video transmission.   
 
Figure E5.  Sequence Diagram of AVReceive Construction 
 
Also within the initialize method in Figure E5, a video or an audio session is created 
depending on the value of the Boolean isAudio.  The two methods are initializeAudioSession and 
inititializeVideoSession.  Both of these methods use the same AVSecureRTPSocket constructor 
that is discussed in Section E3. 
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 E5. Secure Implementation of RTPConnector 
Use of the RTPConnector interface allows the AVSecureRTPSocket to initialize the 
RTPManager class developed by Sun Microsystems.  The use of a class diagram illustrated in 
Figure E6 eases the understanding of the implementation.  The three static integers within the 
AVSecureRTPSocket are used to identify the three types of traffic used.  The RTP and RTCP 
protocols have already been discussed in this paper, however, the RSA [39] (Rives Shamir 
Adlerman) algorithm has not.  For implementation of the software, RSA encryption is used 
instead of AES as recommended in the SRTP protocol.  The RSA algorithm is the famous 
security algorithm developed in 1977 by Ron Rives, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adlerman from 
MIT.  The algorithm is more easily implemented within the JSSE (Java Secure Socket 
Extensions) software than is AES; the exact technique is described in detail in Section E7.  Also, 
the reason four DatagramSocket objects are used within the AVSecureRTPSocket is described in  
Figure E6.  AVSecureRTPSocket Class Diagram 
Section E6 which discusses the transmission and receipt of secure RTP traffic.  
Understanding the purpose of the PushSourceStream and OutputDataStream is a prerequisite to 
understanding of the RTPConnector interface, therefore critical to the understanding of how JMF 
RTP traffic can be secured.  The purpose of the PushSourceStream is to maintain a buffer and 
provide a stream of real-time audio or video data to a Java DatagramSocket using 
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 DatagramPackets.  In order for the entire capability of RTP to work, both a control and data 
stream must be provided to the RTPManager in the form of the two methods 
getControlInputStream and getDataInputStream.  Only the DataInputStream has been secured in 
the L3AV implementation.  Similarly, the purpose of the OutputDataStream is to maintain a 
buffer and receive from a DatagramSocket the DatagramPackets that contain the real-time audio 
or video data.  Additionally, the close method closes all the objects of the classes  
PushSourceStream and OutputDataStream.  The RTCP Bandwidth and SenderBandwidth 
methods are used to notify the RTPManager of what frequency the RTCP messages should be 
sent.  The last four variables: getReceiveBufferSize, getSendBufferSize, setReceiveBufferSize 
and setSendBufferSize are used to set up the two internal buffers.  Additionally, the parameters 
listed in Table E1 are used to initialize the AVSecureRTPSocket.   
 
The AVSecureRTPSocket returns both a PushSourceStream and an OutputDataStream to 
the RTPManager object when the respective methods are called.  The 
AVSecureOutputDataStream is illustrated in Figure E7.  It can be seen that the class implements 
the method “write” from the OutputDataStream interface.  The “data” parameter refers to the data 
that is supplied to the buffer, which is being maintained within the AVSecureOutputDataStream.  
89 
 The offset and length integers enable the construction of a DatagramPacket from the contents of 
the buffer, so that the resulting packet can be supplied to the class DatagramSocket.    
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure E7.  OutputDataStream Class Diagram 
 
The complexity of the class AVSecurePushSourceStream is greater than the class 
OutputDataStream because reading from a data source and then supplying the contents of the data 
source requires the use of a thread.  Also, since the capability of a thread is required, the three 
methods; start, kill and run were added.  Since the class must implement the PushSourceStream 
interface, the read method returning an integer is required.  The DatagramSocket uses this method 
with the parameters of a buffer, offset and length similar to the write method within the 
AVSecureOutputDataStream class.  The minimum transfer size which is returned in the 
getMinimumTransferSize method is set to twice the value of the MTU (Maximum Transmission 
Unit) to ensure a balance between resource utilization and inherent delay within the system.  The 
value is set at 2048 bytes because an 802.11 MTU of 1024 bytes generates greater access 
efficiency than a value of 512 bytes [31].  The SourceTransferHandler class purpose is to 
facilitate data transfers from the PushSourceStream to the DatagramSocket.  The 
PushSourceStream contains the superinterfaces of SourceStream and Controls because five 
additional methods are required within the class AVSecurePushSourceStream.  The method 
endOfStream always returns the value false because the AVSecurePushSourceStream returns a 
stream as long as the thread is alive.  The ContentDescriptor is always returned null, because 
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 descriptions of the content are handled in the upper layer in both the L3AV, as well as in H.323 
and SIP implementations as opposed to within the RTP layer.   
The content length is returned with the value unknown.  The controls are returned with 
similar values for the same reason that the content descriptor values are absent.  Thus, the 
getControls method returns an empty array and the getControl always returns a null object.  The 
parameters required for the construction of the AVSecurePushSourceStream is shown in Table 
E2.  The DatagramSocket indicates which socket receives the stream from the class 
AVSecurePushSourceStream.  The address indicates which address the datagram packet will be 
sent from and the integer port identifies the correct originating process port.  It is required that the 
AVClientController be passed because the L3AVSecurity features that handle the encryption and 
decryption of the datagram packets which have a pointer within the AVClientController object.   
The protocol can be one of the three protocols discussed above, RTP, RTCP or RSA.  The 
 
Figure E8.  AVSecurePushSourceStream Class Diagram 
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 receiverID is used for debugging purposes to identify which of the eight types of streams this 
AVSecurePushSourceStream object is pushing.  Details of the eight types of streams are within 
Section E6.  Additionally, the isShowingStreams parameter is also used for debugging purposes 
to view the contents of the data stream as received by the AVSecurePushSourceStream. 
  Table E2. AVSecurePushSourceStream Constructor 
Parameter Name Class 
sock DatagramSocket 
 
 
addr InetAddress  
 port int 
 anAVClientController AVClientController
 aProtocol int 
 aReceiverID int 
 isShowingStreams boolean 
  
 
E6. Transmission and Receipt of Secure RTP Traffic 
With understanding of the primary components of and within the AVSecureRTPSocket 
complete, the method to secure the transmission between both the sender and receiver sockets can 
now be discussed.  To allow basic understanding of the AVSecureRTPSocket, the case of no 
security is first considered.  For this implementation, four streams are required since the 
AVSecureRTPSocket implements the RTPConnector interface.  These four streams can be found 
in Table E3 as L3AV streams one, five, seven and eight.  Stream one is referred to as 
“dataOutputStream” in the RTPConnector interface.  For an insecure implementation of L3AV, 
the datagram socket type is data, whereas the encrypting datagram socket is used when the RTP 
traffic is secured.  Continuing with the example of the insecure RTP traffic, stream six, referred to 
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 as dataInputStream in the RTPConnector interface, is a datagram source which is used by the 
RTPManager to receive the data content.  In a similar manner, streams seven and eight act as sink 
and source of the control data that is sent by the RTPManager class.   
  Table E3. L3AV Streams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
L3AV 
Stream 
Stream 
described in 
RTPConnector 
Interface 
Sink or Source 
Datagram 
Socket 
Type 
1 Yes Sink encrypting or data 
When the L3AV capability secures the traffic, four additional streams are needed.  The 
capability of the six streams associated with the encryption and decryption of data is illustrated in 
Figure E7.  The encrypt datagram socket is associated with streams one and two which act as sink 
and source respectively.  Stream one is responsible for accepting the incoming RTP traffic and 
then supplying the traffic to stream two which is responsible for supplying the traffic to a process 
named AVSecurityRTPThread which is described Section E7.  Following the encryption process, 
streams three and four are used by the AVSecurityRTPThread class and the secure datagram 
socket to send and receive the secured RTP traffic between the two endpoints.  Finally, streams 
five and six act as a sink from the AVSecurityRTPThread class and as a source to the 
RTPManager class on the receiving end.   
2 No Source encrypting 
3 No Sink secureData 
4 No Source secureData 
5 No Sink data 
6 Yes Source data 
7 Yes Sink control 
8 Yes Source control 
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Figure E9.  Streams Associated with Encryption and Decryption of Data 
 
E7. Encryption and Decryption Method 
 The four streams associated with encryption and decryption (streams 2-5 in Figure E9) 
are attributes of the class AVSecurityRTPThread (See Figure E10).  The purpose of this thread is 
to continuously encrypt and decrypt RTP traffic in cooperation with the AVSecureRTPSocket 
and to also ensure the packets are sent to the correct destination.  Additionally, two objects of the 
class AVSecureRTPPacketReceiver are used to receive the encrypted and unencrypted packets 
for the purpose of decryption and encryption.   
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 Figure E10.  AVSecurityRTPThread Class Diagram 
 
The class diagram for the AVSecureRTPPacketReceiver illustrated in Figure 11 extends 
from the class RTPPacketReceiver which contains the method receiveFrom.  The receiveFrom 
method supplies a Packet which is either encrypted or decrypted as controlled by the 
AVSecurityRTPThread.   
Figure E11.  AVSecurityRTPPacketReceiver Class Diagram 
 
Figure E12 describes how the unencrypted packet is encrypted.  After the receipt of an 
unencrypted packet through the use of the read method within the unencrypted packet receiver, 
the datagram packet is encrypted through the use of the AVSecurity encryptAll method.  It is 
possible to use any type of security algorithm within this method; however as stated before, the 
RSA algorithm is implemented.  By adding AES encryption and decryption and a block cipher 
mode, the SRTP specification can be achieved.  The addition of these features to L3AV is an 
excellent candidate for additional follow-on work as it an additional step towards fulfilling the 
SRTP specification and greatly increases the inherent security of the system.   
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 Figure E12.  Encryption Sequence Diagram 
 Using nearly an identical approach as the encryption process, the decryption process uses 
the decryptAll method within the AVSecurity object to obtain an unencrypted datagram packet 
which can be sent to the unencrypted output data stream.  Figure E13 illustrates the decryption 
procedure as implemented in the software.   
Figure E13.  Decryption Sequence Diagram 
E8. Conclusion 
This appendix describes the design of the experimental software.  Section E1 explains 
how the RTP Traffic Control layer works to create the different network conditions that are to be 
studied.  Section E2 explains the purpose of the RTP Traffic Layer.  Section E3 describes how the 
transmission object works as part of the secure system.  Section E4 describes how the receiving 
object works as part of the secure system.  Section E5 describes the class of secure sockets that 
are used in this software implementation.  Section E6 describes the transmission and receipt of 
secure traffic.  Section E7 describes how the data contents of the RTP traffic is encrypted before 
transmission and receipt over a possibly compromised data channel.   
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